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Abstract
At its core, cryptography is focused on establishing secret communication between
two parties. Traditionally, this goal required both legal parties to share some kind of
common information which had to be kept secret from an eavesdropper - the so-called
private key. One major problem consists of finding a way to generate and establish
a shared secret key between two parties without the availability of a secure channel.
One can tackle this problem using established key exchange methods. Techniques
from public-key cryptography can be employed to solve this problem. Still, they
rely on unproven assumptions, namely the problem of NP 6= P . Moreover, these
methods are strongly time and energy consuming, which can be critical for low-
energy applications, such as wireless sensor networks. One of the most promising
techniques for the key exchange problem makes use of the properties of the phys-
ical layer, namely of the wireless channel. In this approach, emitted radio signals
are scattered and reflected from various physical obstacles such as cars, buildings,
trees, and many others. Thus, a receiver will receive the original signal superposed
with several echoes caused by reflections, as stated by the multipath interference
property. The reciprocity property of the channel ensures that both parties receive
the same echo pattern when the exchange is performed fast enough. The shared
randomness therefore results from unknown and dynamic electromagnetic characte-
ristics of the common physical environment. This method also contributes to avoid
a mass surveillance scenario, as, for this purpose, an attacker would have to be con-
tinuously able to reproduce this protocol between the communicating parties exactly
at the same time they perform it, which requires physical presence. In this thesis,
we consider key exchange at the physical layer in the following three aspects:
Vulnerabilities and Attacks. The conditions under which this method is secure
are not totally clear. What if the environment is too simple, e.g. a desert, where the
entropy is almost non-existent? Are there any kind of side-channel attacks against
this method, i.e. attacks based on the physical properties of the device or on imple-
mentation details? We demonstrate that indeed this protocol is not totally secure
if the environment is too simple and propose an attack called environment recon-
struction attack. We thereby draw attention to an aspect of reciprocity-based key
exchange that has so far been neglected. More precisely, we provide a model scenario
for fading channels in which a passive eavesdropping adversary can reconstruct a key
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generated by the protocol parties. Furthermore, we present a side-channel attack
against the implementation. This attack is based on the fact that antennas reradiate
all the signals they receive. We called this attack the reradiation leakage attack. We
develop an exhaustive analysis and we characterize the conditions under which this
attack can be mounted. Upper theoretical bounds for the feasibility of this attack
are derived. We experimentally validated this attack.
Improvements to the Protocol. We explain how we can extend the source of
entropy to the hardware using the example of a direct-conversion receiver. For this
purpose, we utilize the properties of some hardware components, namely those of
the transceivers’ local oscillators, as an additional source of randomness shared by
the legitimate parties. Reciprocity will still hold, allowing shared key extraction.
This method has the additional advantage of being more resistant to the reradiation
leakage side-channel attack on reciprocity-based wireless key exchange. Simulation
results that seek to validate our new protocol are presented.
Experimental Validation. We developed a prototype which served as a proof-of-
concept for this method and experimentally validated our novel protocol. Several
experiments under different environments were performed in order to prove the fea-
sibility of this method. Our studies also address some limitations and propose solu-
tions.
Zusammenfassung
Im Kern der Kryptographie steht die sichere Kommunikation zwischen zwei Parteien.
Für gewöhnlich kann dieses Ziel erreicht werden, indem ein sogenannter geheimer
Schlüssel zwischen beiden Kommunikationspartnern geteilt wird. Etwaigen Mithör-
ern ist dieser jedoch unbekannt. Eines der Hauptprobleme besteht darin, den Schlüs-
sel ohne einen sicheren Kanal zu generieren und zwischen beiden Parteien zu teilen.
Verschiedene Methoden im Rahmen der Public-Key-Kryptographie können zur Lö-
sung dieses Problems Anwendung finden. Diese beruht jedoch auf einigen unbe-
wiesenen Annahmen, wie dem NP 6= P-Problem. Ein Nachteil dieser Methoden
ist zudem der hohe Aufwand an Energie und Zeit, welcher besonders bei Anwen-
dungen mit geringem Energieverbrauch, wie etwa drahtlosen Netzwerken, kritisch
zu bewerten ist. Eines der erfolgversprechendsten Verfahren zum Teilen eines kryp-
tographischen Schlüssels beruht auf den Eigenschaften der physikalischen Schicht,
genauer gesagt dem drahtlosen Kanal. In diesem Fall wird die ausgestrahlte Radios-
trahlung an verschiedenen Hindernissen, wie etwa Autos, Gebäuden oder Bäumen,
gestreut und reflektiert. Es kommt zur Überlagerung der Wellen, in deren Folge
zusätzlich zum ursprünglich ausgesendeten Signal verschiedene Echos empfangen
werden. Die Reziprozitätseigenschaft eines Kanals gewährleistet, dass beide Parteien
dasselbe Muster des Echos empfangen, wenn der Austausch schnell genug abläuft.
Die Zufälligkeit, mit der dieses Muster entsteht, resultiert aus der unbekannten und
sich ständig ändernden physischen Umwelt. Diese Methode sorgt zudem dafür, dass
ein Szenario der Massenüberwachung verhindert werden kann. Ein Angreifer müsste
nämlich das Protokoll zwischen den beiden kommunizierenden Parteien kontinuier-
lich mithören, was seine physische Präsenz bedingen würde. In dieser Arbeit wird
der Austausch eines kryptographischen Schlüssels über die physikalische Schicht hin-
sichtlich folgender drei Aspekte bewertet:
Verwundbarkeit und Angriffe. Die Bedingungen, unter denen diese Methode sicher
ist, sind noch nicht vollkommen bekannt. Was passiert, wenn die Umgebung kaum
Merkmale mit Informationsgehalt, wie es etwa in Wüsten der Fall ist, aufweist? Ex-
istieren Seitenkanalangriffe gegen diese Methode, beispielsweise Angriffe basierend
auf den physikalischen Eigenschaften der Apparatur oder bei der Umsetzung? Es
wird aufgezeigt, dass es tatsächlich keine hundertprozentige Sicherheit gibt, wenn
die Umgebung zu einfach aufgebaut ist. Es wird ein Angriff auf das System model-
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liert, der in diesem Zusammenhang als environment reconstruction attack bezeich-
net werden soll. Dabei soll der Fokus auf einem Aspekt des wechselseitigen Aus-
tausches des Schlüssels liegen, welcher bislang vernachlässigt wurde. Konkret wird
ein Szenario fading Kanäle modelliert, welches einem passiven Abhörer ermöglicht,
den kryptographischen Schlüssel zwischen zwei kommunizierender Parteien nachzu-
bilden. Des Weiteren wird ein Seitenkanalangriff unter der Bezeichnung reradiation
leakage attack modelliert. Grundlage hierfür ist die Rückstrahlung der von Anten-
nen empfangenen Signale. Es wurde eine gründliche Analysemethode entwickelt.
Außerdem wurden die Bedingungen charakterisiert, unter denen ein solcher Angriff
abläuft. Die Obergrenze für die Durchführbarkeit dieses Angriffs werden abgeleitet,
eine experimentelle Durchführung soll zur Validierung dienen.
Fortschritte beim Protokoll. Es wird ausgeführt, wie man die Quellen der Entropie
bis zur Hardware erweitern kann, indem beispielsweise ein Direktmischempfänger
eingesetzt wird. Zu diesem Zweck werden Eigenschaften einiger Hardwarekomponen-
ten, die lokalen Oszillatoren des Transceivers, eingesetzt, um weitere Zufälligkeiten
bei der Kommunikation zweier autorisierter Kommunikationspartner zu erhalten.
Die Reziprozitätseigenschaft bleibt erhalten, was die gemeinsame Schlüsselerzeu-
gung ermöglicht. Die Anwendung dieser Strategie bietet einen zusätzlichen Vorteil,
da die Verwundbarkeit gegenüber dem reradiation leakage side-channel-Angriff so
geringer ist. Simulationen, welche die Funktionsfähigkeit des neu gestalteten Pro-
tokolls bestätigen, werden abschließend vorgestellt.
Experimentelle Validierung. Es wurde ein Prototyp entwickelt, welcher die theo-
retischen Überlegungen belegt und zur experimentellen Validierung des Protokolls
dienen soll. Eine Vielzahl an Experimenten wurde in verschiedenen Umgebungen
durchgeführt, um die Realisierbarkeit dieser Methode zu prüfen. Die Studie befasst
sich außerdem mit verschiedenen Einschränkungen und schlägt Lösungsansätze vor.
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1. Introduction
The modern world is inconceivable without considering the security of systems. The
challenges of this new technological era have strongly increased the need for secure
communications. Message secrecy has played a prominent role in historical events
and helped to shape the world as it is today. It seems indisputable that this is
becoming even more important in recent years and so will continue to be in the
future.
The definition of cryptography is intrinsically connected with the notion of secu-
rity, specifically the security of information systems. Nowadays, cryptography can
be defined as the science concerned with the design and analysis of secure infor-
mation systems, i.e. systems able to withstand any kinds of manipulation attempts
[Gol00]. It is a broad discipline involving the knowledge of different fields, like math-
ematics, theoretical and applied informatics, even telecommunications engineering
or, in very specific cases, quantum physics. Developing a holistic approach to the
design of secure communication systems is by no means a trivial task.
In this chapter, we briefly give an overview of the main ideas of cryptography and
introduce the scope of our research.
1.1. General Aspects of Cryptography
As in some other branches of science, cryptography progressed from a kind of art
into a well established science which is part of the field of computer science. This
process took a few centuries. Modern cryptography demands a rigorous treatment
and clear proofs of security.
Originally, cryptography was more concerned with establishing secret communica-
tion between two parties. This goal required legal parties sharing secret information
- the so called private key. This was the basic scenario of private-key cryptography
(also called symmetric cryptography), which we will explain more in detail in Section
1.1.1. Nevertheless, this approach still presented a few drawbacks, namely the need
of a different key for each two-party communication and a means for establishing a
shared secret key between two parties via an untrusted channel.
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman proposed in their seminal work [DH76] the usage of
two mathematically related keys in order to exchange messages secretly. This marks
1
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the beginning of a new area of cryptography, namely the public-key cryptography
(or asymmetric cryptography), as we will see in Section 1.1.2. These developments
brought cryptography and complexity theory together. The scope of cryptography
was extended by digital signatures and message authentication codes.
Fault-tolerant protocols were developed in order to ensure that a protocol is ex-
ecuted correctly by the involved parties. This lead to the construction of so-called
Zero-Knowledge Protocols. This cryptographic primitive (a basic cryptographic con-
struction block) plays an important role in proving the security of cryptographic
protocols.
Another problem for which cryptography provides elegant solutions is the problem
of calculating the output of a certain function whose inputs are kept secret by one
of each parties. The first problem that raised this question was the famous Yao’s
Millionaires’ Problem [Yao82]. Here two millionaire’s want to know which one is
richer without revealing the value of their fortune and without the help of a third
party.
In 1996, a new kind of attack was introduced. Rather than mathematically at-
tacking the protocol itself, these attacks used physical properties of the devices
or implementation details in order to break the system. They were called side-
channel attacks. The first one was a timing attack first introduced by Paul Kocher
in [Koc96]. A major breakthrough occurred in this area when Kocher showed in
[KJJ99] how to extract the secret key from a device by merely analyzing the electric
current consumption during a decryption (resp. encryption) phase and by knowing
the processed ciphertext (resp. plaintext). This discovery forced researchers to look
for countermeasures. Nowadays these measures are taken into consideration when
implementing industrial and commercial security solutions.
Advances in technology and new requirements will certainly make sure that cryp-
tography will be full of new interesting problems waiting to be solved in the years
to follow.
1.1.1. Private-Key Cryptography
The oldest and more basic scenario in cryptography raises when two legitimate
parties (usually called Alice and Bob) intend to secretly exchange a message in
a public channel, without an eavesdropper (commonly referred to as Eve) being
able to understand its content. Private-key cryptography focuses on the study of
cryptographic systems such that Alice and Bob somehow (as we will be able to
see later) already share a secret key, obviously kept secret from Eve. Symmetric
cryptography develops algorithms using this secret key (usually called ciphers) in
order to transform the plain message (usually called plaintext) into a string - the
ciphertext - which cannot be understood without the knowledge of the secret key.
Let Enck and Deck be the encryption and decryption algorithms using the secret
key k, respectively, x the plaintext, and y := Enck(x) the ciphertext. The basic
property that an encryption system has to fulfill is the following: Deck(Enck(x)) =
x. Clearly, this means that encryption and decryption are inverse operations and
that one can therefore recover the plaintext given the ciphertext, as long as the
secret key is provided.
Claude Shannon developed a mathematical framework in his 1948 famous work
[Sha48] for the analysis of the information and established that a perfect secret
or information-theoretically secure encryption would be one where the ciphertext
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provides no information about the plaintext. In other words, this means that the
entropy of the messages (related to the idea of randomness) is kept constant even
after the knowledge of the ciphertext. In Shannon’s theory, it is proven that this is
only possible if the secret key is as long as the plaintext, which makes it impractical
for daily applications. The perfectly secure encryption scheme Shannon proposed is
the so-called one-time pad, where the ciphertext y is given by y := Enck(x) = x⊕k.
In practice, however, keys are shorter than the plaintext and must be reused several
times. This implies that the encryption and decryption ciphers should be carefully
designed in order not to leak any information about the secret key.
Historically, several ciphers have been successively developed and constantly been
broken. Prominent examples are the Shift Cipher, Substitution Cipher, Affine Ci-
pher, Vigenère Cipher, Hill Cipher and Permutation Cipher. In our days, the avail-
able computational power is enough to easily break this kind of ciphers. Not only
statistical properties can be used to break the systems, but also the small amount
of possible keys (i.e., the entropy of the key) makes it feasible to perform exhaus-
tive search. All these ciphers belong to the group of so-called block ciphers. The
ciphertext y is constructed by breaking the plaintext x into several blocks of equal
length, i.e., x := x1x2..., and encrypting each block separately with the same key
k, i.e., y := y1y2... = Enck(x1)Enck(x2).... In stream ciphers, plaintext blocks are
encrypted using a keystream z := z1z2.... The ciphertext will be constructed as
y = Encz1(x1)Encz2(x2).... A detailed description of each of one of these ciphers
can be found in [Sti02].
Cryptography is primarily concerned with finding possible secure ciphers. The
design of appropriate block ciphers is not a trivial task. In 1977, the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) (see [DES77] and [BA81]) was adopted as a standard cryptographic
cipher. This cipher is a block cipher, where each block has a length of 64 bits.
The key is also 64-bit long, including 8 parity bits. While providing a good level of
security during several years, modern computers can perform an exhaustive search
on the DES key space. As a result, the block cipher Rijndael [DR98] was adopted
as the new standard and renamed Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the year
2000. The AES key is usually 128, 192 or 256 bit long, depending on the number
of rounds employed in its structure. This cipher has so far resisted all breaking
attempts and is still vastly employed.
1.1.2. Public-Key Cryptography
Public-key cryptography requires the existence of two possibly different but some-
how related keys - one secret key and one public key. The idea is that Alice generates
a pair of public and private keys which are mathematically related. Then she pub-
lishes her public key. Bob uses this key in order to encrypt the message and sends
the ciphertext to Alice. Alice is the only party who knows her private key enabling
her to decrypt the ciphertext. Eve will not be able to decrypt the ciphertext, as she
has no knowledge about the private key. When considering public-key cryptography,
one mainly refers to the computational security of the systems. Some assumptions
need to be made about the computational power of an adversary and about its pos-
sibility of inverting a so-called one-way function. These functions are hard to invert
unless some knowledge (called trapdoor) is available. Most public-key cryptosys-
tems are based on number-theoretical problems. This is also the case for the RSA
cryptosystem [RSA78]. In this cryptosystem, modular operations (specifically expo-
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nentiations) are used in order to encrypt and decrypt the messages. The modulus is
the product of two big prime numbers that just one of the parties knows. The secu-
rity of this method relies on the fact that an opponent cannot efficiently factorize this
modulus into two primes number. The security of other ciphers relies on the discrete
logarithm (DL) problem. Basically, given a multiplicative group (G,·), an element
α ∈ G having order n and an element β ∈ 〈α〉, this problem asks to find an integer
a, 0 ≤ a ≤ n− 1, such that αa = β. Several public-key cryptosystems are based on
the DL problem, like the ElGamal Cryptosystem. Other public-key cryptosystems
are based in elliptic curves over finite fields. Its application to cryptography was
proposed independently in 1985 by Koblitz [Kob87] and Miller [Mil85].
But public-key cryptosystems are useful not only for message encryption. Public-
key cryptography also comprises digital signatures, a means for providing authenti-
cation and integrity of a message.
As one particular example of the application of public-key cryptography, we would
like to focus on the key exchange problem, the main topic of our work. Key exchange
can be performed using basically any public-key cryptosystem. One of the most de-
ployed methods is the so-called Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange protocol [DH76].
This protocol is also based on the DL-problem. In this case, given a cyclic group
G with order q and a generator g of G, Alice chooses randomly x ∈R Zq and sends
h1 := gx to Bob. Bob performs very similarly, i.e., Bob chooses randomly y ∈R Zq
and sends h2 := gy to Alice. Alice calculates kA := hx2 and Bob calculates kB := h
y
1.
Assuming that the DL-problem is computational hard, Eve should not be able to
calculate the shared key kA = kB.
Public-key techniques require extensive computational power. As a result, hybrid
systems were developed, combining public key techniques merely for the purpose of
key exchange (as RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptography) with private cryptography
methods (e.g., AES) for the encryption and decryption of the transmitted messages.
A detailed introduction to these topics can be found in any textbook, e.g. in
[KL07] or [Sti02].
1.2. Motivation for Wireless Key Exchange
Pre-sharing and manually configuring symmetric keys is one of most used meth-
ods for key establishment in modern wireless devices. This solution is clearly not
practical and flexible enough, as a reset of the key would require physical presence.
As explained in Section 1.1.2, public-key techniques can be employed to solve the
problem of key exchange. However, public-key cryptography relies on still unproven
assumptions, namely the problem ofNP 6= P . Moreover, these methods are strongly
time and energy consuming, which can be critical for low-energy applications and
resource-constrained platforms, such as wireless sensor networks (WSN). This is, in
particular, the case for ZigBee and Bluetooth specifications, where very weak security
mechanisms have been implemented in order to perform the key exchange and have
therefore already been cracked. Due to energy constraints, public-key methods are
not implemented in their standard form. Other known security issues have also been
observed in WiFi Protected Setup (WPS) and other wireless standards.
Up until recently, cryptographic functionality has been solely implemented in the
upper layers of the protocol stack (see Figure 1.1).
For example, admission control, like WiFi Protected Access (WPA), is imple-
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Figure 1.1.: OSI Model layers.
mented at the link layer, Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) at the network layer
or Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) at the transport layer. With the increasing popula-
rity of the wireless interconnection of small embedded systems, the so-called Inter-
net of Things (IoT), new challenges regarding security and privacy awareness have
emerged. Nevertheless, using the physical layer for security purposes was not consi-
dered. Lower levels simply seemed not to offer any properties that could be useful
for security. In recent years, a few authors have been proposing methods for explo-
ring the lower levels of the stack, namely the physical layer (PHY), for improving
the security of the overall system, as described in [BB11].
Lately, the ubiquitous presence of wireless networks has renewed the interest in key
exchange schemes at the physical layer. One of the most promising techniques to gen-
erate cryptographic keys at the physical layer is based on the concept of reciprocity
of wireless channels. Wireless channels exhibit a phenomenon called multipath in-
terference (or multipath fading). The key extraction is simply performed from the
physical structure of the environment where the wireless transmission takes place.
The shared randomness is created by sounding the channel between both legitimate
parties and results from unknown and dynamic electromagnetic characteristics of
the physical environment. In such channels, emitted radio signals are scattered and
reflected from various physical obstacles. Thus a receiver will receive the original
signal superposed with several echoes caused by different reflections. Reciprocity,
in turn, states that the channel between two parties, characterized by its channel
impulse response, will remain the same if the roles of sender and receiver are ex-
changed. Therefore, a sender-receiver system consisting of two physically separated
transceivers, Alice and Bob, can extract joint randomness by measuring the impulse
response of the wireless channel between them. Since the measured channel impulse
response is the same for Alice and Bob during the coherence time of the channel,
it can be processed to a common secret key. For the security of this method, it is
crucial that any further eavesdropper, who is sufficiently distant from the legitimate
protocol parties, will receive uncorrelated measurements.
Therefore, in this work, we studied the feasibility of replacing public-key tech-
niques by physical layer methods for the purpose of key exchange.
One other important motivation for key exchange on the physical layer is the
possibility of avoiding mass surveillance. By using physical-layer security, an attacker
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would have to continuously be able to reproduce the physical layer key exchange
protocol between each communicating parties exactly at the same time they perform
it, which requires him to be physically present. As it is not feasible to have one
surveillance agency per communicating party, this is impossible to realize.
The usage of this kind of key exchange may be eventually combined with other
conventional systems (like the DH key exchange protocol) in order to increase the
computational resources needed to break a system. This can be an interesting sub-
ject for further work.
1.3. Our Contribution
A few methods used to extract a shared key (a binary sequence) from the received
signals have been proposed by different authors. These techniques basically aim
at generating a secret key having as much entropy as possible, while being reliable
and efficient. They are suited for key extraction and key agreement in wireless and
mobile settings, such as wireless sensor networks.
However, the conditions under which they are secure are not totally clear. The
possibility of dealing with environments which are not complex enough should also
be considered. Besides, as in other areas of cryptography, one should consider im-
plementation issues.
In this work, we demonstrate that indeed this protocol is not totally secure if the
environment is too simple and propose an attack we named environment reconstruc-
tion attack. Moreover, we present a side-channel attack against its implementation.
This attack is based on the fact that antennas reradiate all the signals they receive.
We called this attack the reradiation leakage attack. We establish under which cir-
cumstances this attack is feasible and define a region outside of which an attacker
must be in so he cannot collect significant information from the reradiated signal.
We additionally propose a new method to extract raw information from the en-
vironment. Our technique explores the characteristics of the channel in different
frequencies. Our main contribution consists in leveraging the properties of some
hardware components for the purpose of generating a shared key containing more
entropy. We use the local oscillators of the transceivers as the additional source of
randomness shared by the legitimate parties. This is done without affecting the over-
all symmetry of the system. Consequently, reciprocity will still hold, which further
allows for common secret key extraction. This method has the advantage of being
more resistant to the reradiation leakage side-channel attack on reciprocity-based
wireless key exchange, as an attacker should somehow know the exact frequency
Alice and Bob’s oscillators are tuned to in order to mount an attack.
Finally, we develop a radio prototype in order to serve as a proof-of-concept and
experimentally validate our protocol. We perform a variety of experiments under
different environments. We address some limitations and propose solutions.
Thesis Outline After introducing the necessary background knowledge needed to
understand our work, we put forward our main achievements: we present new meth-
ods for breaking the fading-based key exchange protocols proposed up until now
in Chapter 4 and introduce and experimentally validate a novel technique to cope
with these new attacks in Chapters 5 and 6. Our work is divided into the following
chapters:
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Chapter 2. Preliminaries In this chapter, we introduce the basic notions neces-
sary for fully understanding the methods we have implemented. More precisely, we
expound some topics concerning antenna theory, wireless channels and information
reconciliation. No original contribution by the author is put forward here.
Chapter 3. Related Work We give a rundown of the literature and methods
employed for the transmission of a secret (like a bitstring that might be later used
as a secret key) or for authentication purposes implemented in the physical layer. We
classify them as noise-based, reciprocity-&-fading-based, antenna-based, jamming-
based and device-based methods. The main principles of reciprocity-&-fading-based
methods, against which we have mounted attacks in our work, are described in
more detail. We explain some known methods for key extraction and we summarize
previous results about wireless key exchange.
Chapter 4. Vulnerabilities and Attacks We demonstrate an aspect of reciprocity-
based key exchange that has so far been neglected. A model for fading channels is
described under which a passive eavesdropping adversary can reconstruct a key gen-
erated by two protocol parties. We introduce some vulnerabilities of the fading-based
key exchange protocol and mount an attacked we named environment reconstruc-
tion attack. Additionally, a new side-channel attack is presented. This side-channel
attack is based on the phenomenon of passive signal reradiation that occurs in receiv-
ing antennas. We called it reradiation leakage attack. An experimental test of this
attack is described and the results are analyzed. The exact conditions under which
this attack can be mounted are identified in detail. Upper theoretical bounds for
the feasibility of this attack are derived. The results are published in [DLMdA10].
Chapter 5. Improvements to the Protocol We introduce a countermeasure
against the environment reconstruction attack. This measure also helps against the
reradiation side-channel attack, introducing a new variable for the entropy genera-
tion, namely the unavoidable and unpredictable difference in the frequencies between
Alice and Bob’s transceivers’ local oscillators. For a perfect attack, the attacker
would also need to estimate both these frequencies with a very high degree of pre-
cision, which, in reality, is not easy to perform with common receivers. Simulations
illustrating these ideas are presented. The main results are published in [MdA14]
and [DLMQdA10].
Chapter 6. Experimental Validation We present an experimental study that
validates the above mentioned countermeasure. A measurement campaign has been
undertaken and information has been collected under different environments, both
indoor and outdoor. The goal was to make sure that our method is stable and
applicable under different environment conditions. We also seek to find the better
way of combining the effects from fading with those due to different oscillation
frequencies. The results are analyzed in detail.
Chapter 7. Conclusion We conclude our work and point out new directions for
further research.

2. Preliminaries
In this chapter, we introduce the underlying concepts that are required to understand
this work. Note that we do not intend to put forward a fully detailed introduction
of the presented subjects, but only introduce the strictly necessary notions. Some
important concepts are constantly mentioned throughout this work, namely some
notions about antenna theory, wireless channels and channel reciprocity, as well as
some ideas about information reconciliation. For the sake of self-containedness of
this work, we will briefly describe these concepts. Most of the content is based on
the sources referenced in the text. We refer the interested reader to those references.
2.1. Antenna Theory
Since key exchange based on fading channels depend upon the transmission of elec-
tromagnetic waves using transceivers equipped with any kind of antennas, we show
some important ideas related to this topic. This theory is also important in order
to fully understand the reradiation leakage attack presented in Section 4.2. For a
thorough understanding of this subject, refer to [Bal97].
2.1.1. Antenna Radiation Pattern and Directivity
A very important notion when characterizing an antenna is the so-called radiation
pattern. The radiation patters (also called antenna pattern) of an antenna refers to
the spatial dependence of the emitted or received radiation. It can be described as
a mathematical function (usually calculated from electromagnetic theory) or as a
graphical representation (usually measured through experimentation). It is a mea-
sure for how strong an antenna emits or receives in a certain direction.
Some types of antennas have very peculiar radiation patterns: an isotropic an-
tenna is an antenna which reradiates equally in all directions; an omnidirectional
antenna is an antenna having a constant radiation in a certain plane; finally, a direc-
tional antenna is able to transmit or receive signals differently in different directions.
Therefore, it is able to transmit and receive better in some directions than others.
Figure 2.1 shows an example of a directional antenna radiation pattern. This ra-
diation pattern corresponds to a Yagi antenna, which is an antenna mainly used
for the reception of TV signals. It is clear that this antenna radiates stronger in
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one direction (usually the 0◦ direction), corresponding to the so-called main lobe.
Opposite to this lobe, we can observe a very small back lobe (in the 180◦ direction).
In other directions, one can clearly recognize some minor or side lobes.
This antenna covers a relatively small area for sending and receiving information
signals. In practice, only the signals incoming from the directions between 20◦ and
−20◦ will be captured by the antenna.
Figure 2.1.: Radiation Pattern of a Yagi antenna (source: [Mor11]).
One important parameter of an antenna is its directivity. It is defined as the
ratio of the radiation intensity in a given direction from the antenna to the radiation
intensity averaged over all directions [Bal97]. In case the direction is not explicitly
mentioned, one usually refers to the direction of maximum radiation intensity. This
is also called maximum directivity. This is an expression of the extension of the main
lobe of the radiation pattern. The bigger its directivity, the higher the capability
of an antenna to send or receive in a certain direction in comparison with the other
directions. By visual inspection of the radiation pattern shown in Figure 2.1, we
can say that the corresponding antenna has a relatively high directivity. The gain
of an antenna is proportional to its directivity. Furthermore, the antenna radiation
patterns of the emitter and receiver are of utmost importance, a fact that plays an
important role in our experiments.
2.1.2. Antenna Reradiation
We will now briefly describe the fundamentals about antenna models. Antennas can
work either in the receiving mode or in the transmitting mode. For both modes, the
used models are quite similar and explained next.
2.1.2.1. Transmitting Mode
Consider the following model of an antenna in the transmitting mode (Figure 2.2).
The ratio of the voltage to the current at its terminals, 1 and 2, is called the
impedance of the antenna, and is given by
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2.2.2: Antenna Model Circuit.
Figure 2.2.: Antenna in transmitting mode.
ZA = RA + jXA, (2.1)
where RA is the antenna resistance at its terminals, and XA its reactance. RA can
be expressed as
RA = Rr +RL, (2.2)
where Rr is the radiation resistance of the antenna and RL its loss resistance.
If we consider its Thévenin equivalent and the antenna connected to a wave gen-
erator with impedance Zg,
Zg = Rg + jXg, (2.3)
where Rg and Xg are the resistance and reactance of the generator, respectively, we
have that the power delivered to the antenna for radiation is given by
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Pr =
1
2 |Ig|
2Rr =
|Vg|2
2
Rr
(Rr +RL +Rg)2 + (XA +Xg)2
, (2.4)
the power dissipated as heat by
PL =
1
2 |Ig|
2RL =
|Vg|2
2
RL
(Rr +RL +Rg)2 + (XA +Xg)2
, (2.5)
and the rest of the energy dissipated as heat on the internal resistance Rg of the
generator by
Pg =
|Vg|2
2
Rg
(Rr +RL +Rg)2 + (XA +Xg)2
(2.6)
From elementary computations, it readily follows that one can maximize the power
delivered to the antenna when we have the case of conjugate matching1, i.e., when
ZA = Z∗g (2.7)
From this expression, it appears clear that:
Pr =
|Vg|2
8
Rr
(Rr +RL)2
(2.8)
PL =
|Vg|2
8
RL
(Rr +RL)2
(2.9)
Pg =
|Vg|2
8
1
Rr +RL
(2.10)
From expressions (2.8) to (2.10), it is obvious that Pg = Pr + PL.
This means that of the total power that is provided by the generator, one half is
dissipated as thermal energy (heat) in the internal resistance of the generator and
the other half is delivered to the antenna. Part of the power delivered to the antenna
is radiated, represented here by the radiation resistance, Rr, and the other part is
dissipated as heat. In the case of a perfect lossless antenna, a maximum of 50% of
the total power given to the antenna is radiated.
2.1.2.2. Receiving Mode
Consider now an antenna in the receiving mode (Figure 2.3). The incident wave
reaches the antenna and it induces a voltage VT very similar to the voltage Vg
induced by the generator in the transmitting mode (cf. 2.1.2.1). Therefore, as the
similarities are obvious, we can replace Vg by VT in the previous expressions (2.8 to
2.10) under conjugate matching
1z∗ = x− jy stands for the conjugate operator of a given complex quantity z = x+ jy.
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Figure 2.3.: Antenna in receiving mode.
ZA = Z∗T (2.11)
to conclude that the power delivered to the resistors Pr, PL and PT are:
Pr =
|VT|2
8
Rr
(Rr +RL)2
(2.12)
PL =
|VT|2
8
RL
(Rr +RL)2
(2.13)
PT =
|VT|2
8
1
Rr +RL
(2.14)
The collected power, Pc is given by
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Pc =
|VT|2
4
1
Rr +RL
(2.15)
The power Pr will play a very important role in our work in Section 4.2. This power
is called scattered or reradiated power. Half of the total collected power is delivered
to the load RT and the other half is reradiated through Rr and dissipated as heat
through RL. In a lossless antenna (RL = 0), half of the collected power is delivered
to the load and the other half is reradiated. We use this fact to mount a side-channel
attack against a key exchange protocol.
In general, we define the reradiating factor, ρ, as the fraction of the incoming
power, Pi, reaching an antenna that is reradiated, i.e., ρ := PrPi .
Under conjugate matching, Pi = Pc and, therefore,
ρ = Pr
Pc
= 12
Rr
Rr +RL
. (2.16)
2.2. The Wireless Channel
The wireless channel plays a fundamental role for the subject of this thesis, namely
for generating and sharing a symmetric cryptographic key between two communi-
cating parties. For the sake of self-containedness, we present in this section the
necessary notions for understanding our work. An extensive study on this subject
can be found in [TV05]. We use the same notation throughout this section.
It seems obvious that the broadcast nature of the wireless channel makes it prone
to eavesdropping. In this section, we will introduce the basic notions related with
this transmission medium and its basic physical parameters.
The variations of the channel strength over time and over frequency constitute
two of its basic properties, which clearly do not occur in a cabled medium, like a
coaxial cable or an optical fiber. These variations can be divided in two large classes,
namely
1. Large-scale fading: path loss over large distances and shadowing by large ob-
jects in the environment (like buildings) are the main cause of this type of
fading. It is frequency independent;
2. Small-scale fading: consequence of wave interference (constructive and/or de-
structive) over small distances, due to the fact that there are multiple paths
between the transmitter and the receiver. Its influence is in the order of the
carrier wavelength. It is frequency dependent. It is commonly known as mul-
tipath interference and is of paramount importance to our work.
In order to better understand the wireless channel, some models have been created.
2.2.1. Physical Models
This section is based on the textbook by Tse [TV05]. The interested reader should
refer to this work. Electromagnetic waves are explained and described by the fa-
mous Maxwell’s equations. These equations can be expressed in differential and
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integral form and are usually not easy to solve analytically or even using numerical
methods. In certain complex environments, solving these equations might be even a
practically impossible task. Therefore, stochastic models for describing the wireless
channel have been proposed. To model the wireless channels, one divides the com-
plex environment in simpler cases. Four main cases of increasing complexity will be
considered for modeling the wireless channel.
1. Free space propagation and fixed antennas;
2. Free space propagation and moving antenna;
3. Reflecting wall and fixed antenna;
4. Reflecting wall and moving antenna.
Free space propagation is not very common in the real world, except for the cases
of communication in space or in a desert. The last two cases are the ones that appear
more often, either in static (none or reduced movement) or dynamic environments.
2.2.1.1. Free Space Propagation and Fixed Antenna
Let us start with the following basic scenario. Consider a fixed antenna and the
electromagnetic waves propagating freely in space (Figure 2.4).
r
Figure 2.4.: Free space and fixed antennas.
We know from electromagnetic theory that the electric and magnetic fields are
perpendicular to each other and to the direction of propagation from the antenna.
For this reason, it is sufficient to consider and describe the electric field. Given that
the transmitter has sent a sinusoidal wave, say s(t) = cos(2pift), the electric far-field
at instant t is given by the following expression:
E(f, t, (r, θ, ψ)) =αS(θ, ψ, f)s(t− r/c)
r
=αS(θ, ψ, f) cos(2pif(t− r/c)
r
, (2.17)
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where (r, θ, ψ) are the spherical coordinates of a point in space and s(t − r/c) a
delayed replica of the original signal s(t). We consider the transmitter antenna
placed at the origin of the coordinate axis, which means that r is the distance
between transmitter and receiver antennas. c is the speed the radiation propagates
freely at, and αS(θ, ψ, f) is the radiation pattern of the sending antenna at frequency
f in the direction (θ, ψ). The radiation pattern of an antenna basically indicates how
much radiation an antenna can send and receive in each direction and has already
been described in detail in the Section 2.1.1. Electromagnetic theory states that the
amplitude of the electric fields depends on 1/r, and its power changes with 1/r2 in
free propagation. A receiver antenna will therefore receive
Er(f, t, (r, θ, ψ)) =
α(θ, ψ, f) cos(2pif(t− r/c)
r
, (2.18)
where α(θ, ψ, f) is the aggregate product of the radiation patterns of the sender, αS,
and receiver antennas, αR, i.e., α := αS · αR.
2.2.1.2. Free Space Propagation and Moving Antenna
Now consider the case where the receiving antenna is moving with constant speed v
(Figure 2.5).
r +v·t
0
v
Figure 2.5.: Free space and moving antennas.
Using Equation (2.17) and substituting r(t) by r(t) = r0 + vt, where r0 is the
initial position, we get the following equation:
E(f, t, (r0 + vt, θ, ψ)) =
αS(θ, ψ, f) cos(2pif(t− r0/c− vt/c)
r0 + vt
=αS(θ, ψ, f) cos(2pif(t(1− v/c)− r0/c))
r0 + vt
. (2.19)
By other words, the sinusoid at frequency f has been transformed into a sinusoid
of frequency f(1− v/c). There exists a shift of frequency of value −v/c. This shift
of frequency is called Doppler shift and is due to the relative motion of transmitter
and receiver.
The received electromagnetic wave will be given, analogously to (2.18), by
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Er(f, t, (r0 + vt, θ, ψ)) =
α(θ, ψ, f) cos(2pif(t(1− v/c)− r0/c))
r0 + vt
.. (2.20)
2.2.1.3. Reflecting Wall and Fixed Antenna
We will now introduce the case where objects are to be found in the environment
(Figure 2.6). Let’s consider we have a direct path between a sender antenna and a
receiver antenna, but also a reflected path in a wall.
r
d
Figure 2.6.: Reflecting wall and fixed antennas.
The received waveform will be the result of the sum of the free space wave from
the transmitter and the reflected free space waves from each of the reflecting objects,
namely the wall. In the literature, this method is called ray tracing. Electromagnetic
theory tells us that if a very large wall or object is located at a position d from the
transmitter antenna, the reflected wave at a given point is the same as a wave that
would exist on the symmetric side of the wall in the case there weren’t any wall,
which means at a distance of 2d−r. According to (2.18), we have the received signal
given by
Er(f, t, (r, θ, ψ)) =
α(θ, ψ, f) cos(2pif(t− r/c)
r
−α(θ, ψ, f) cos(2pif(t− (2d− r)/c)2d− r . (2.21)
The phase difference between both waves (direct and reflected) has the value of
∆θ =
(
2pif(2d− r)
c
+ pi
)
−
(
2pifr
c
+ pi
)
= 4pif
c
(d− r) + pi.
Wave theory says that two waves can interact
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• constructively: phase difference is an integer multiple of 2pi; or
• destructively: phase difference is a odd integer multiple of pi.
Thus, a very important parameter is the so-called coherence distance, which is the
distance from a peak to a valley of an electromagnetic field:
∆xc = λ/4,
where λ = c/f is the wavelength of the transmitted signal.
A change in the distance that is much smaller than ∆xc will not result in a
significantly different received signal at a certain instant.
Another important parameter is called the delay spread and is defined as
Td =
2d− r
c
− r
c
.
This corresponds to the difference between the propagation delays along both paths.
The value 1/Td is called the coherence bandwidth of the channel. In situations when
the frequency changes by an amount much smaller than this value, the interference
pattern does not change significantly.
2.2.1.4. Reflecting Wall and Moving Antenna
This is the case that better models the majority of the real-world environments.
Consider that the receiving antenna is moving at a velocity v along the pattern of
constructive an destructive interference induced by the two waves (Figure 2.7).
r +v·t
0
v
d
Figure 2.7.: Reflecting wall and moving antennas.
The strength of the received signal will increase and decrease accordingly. This
is the origin of the multipath fading. To travel from a peak to a minimum of an
electromagnetic wave, it is necessary the time of (λ/4)/v = c/(4fv). This value is
called coherence time of the channel.
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The parameter Ds = 2fv/c is called the Doppler spread. The resulting signal
will be approximately the product of two sinusoids, which is a also a sinusoid of
frequency f and envelope with frequency Ds/2.
Most of the times, wireless channels are time-variant. Their appropriate models
depend on the observed time-scales of interest.
2.2.1.5. Remarks
Another important factor in studying wave propagation in wireless channels is the
the reflection from an “object” which is almost always present: the ground plane. In
particular, this plays an important role in rural areas as reflection objects are scarce
in these areas. It can be shown that the electric wave at the receiver is in this case
attenuated proportionally to r−2 and the received power to (r−2)2 = r−4.
Similarly, due to the presence of obstacles in the environment, one expects the
power decay to be much faster than r−2. Experimentation suggests that while power
decay near the transmitter changes proportionally to r−2, at large distances it can
even decay exponentially with distance.
By modeling the density of obstacles and their absorption behavior as random
numbers, one can simulate this randomness of the environment; the overall phe-
nomenon is called shadowing. This stands in contrast to multipath fading. Its
effects can last for multiple seconds or even minutes, occurring at a much slower
time-scale.
Scattering is another type of reflection and occurs in the atmosphere or in reflec-
tions from very rough objects.
As previously stated, simulating the electromagnetic properties of a real environ-
ment is not a trivial task and might be practically impossible to perform in most
real-world situations.
2.2.2. Channel as a Linear Time-Varying System
Due to the additive nature of electromagnetic waves, wireless channels can be mod-
eled as a linear time-varying system. Consequently, the response of the system (the
wireless channel) to a sinusoidal signal A cos(2pift) of amplitude A and frequency f
will be of the type
n∑
i=1
ρi(f, t)A cos(2pif(t− τi(f, t)), (2.22)
where ρi(f, t) and τi(f, t) are the overall attenuation and propagation delay at time
t in the path i = 1, ..., n. Let’s now assume that these values do not depend on the
frequency. In this case, the received signal y(t) after a given signal s(t) is sent in
the path will be expressed by
y(t) =
n∑
i=1
ρi(t) · s(t− τi(t)). (2.23)
If we consider transmission over narrow bands relative to the used carrier frequency,
f , the individual attenuations and delays are assumed to be independent of the
frequency. However, the overall channel response will vary with frequency due to
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the fact that different paths have different delays. We can therefore state that the
impulse response for a fading multipath channel, i.e., the response of a channel to a
Dirac impulse δ(t) is given by
h(t, τ) =
n∑
i=1
ρi(t) · δ(t− τi(t)). (2.24)
The Doppler shift for path i is then contained in the expression having the value
−fτ ′i(t), where τ ′i(t) = vi/c and vi the velocity with which the ith path is being
modified.
If one considers that the time-scale a channel changes is much bigger than the
delay spread value (in the extreme case, transmitter, receiver and environment are
all stationary), the values of ρi(t) and τi(t) do not depend on t. The electromagnetic
channel characteristics are therefore reduced to those of a linear time-invariant (LTI)
filter. Shortly, a LTI system is a system whose output y(t) to an input s(t) is given
by the convolution of the input s(t) with its impulse response h(t), i.e.,
y(t) = s(t) ∗ h(t) :=
∫ +∞
−∞
s(t− τ)h(τ) dτ. (2.25)
Simplifying (2.24), the impulse response of the channel is simply given by
h(τ) =
n∑
i=1
ρiδ(τ − τi). (2.26)
Usually, one tends to use the variable t instead of τ when describing an impulse
response. Replacing in Equation (2.26), we finally have the expression we will use in
Section 4.1 for mounting an attack against the fading-based key exchange protocol:
h(t) =
n∑
i=1
ρiδ(t− τi). (2.27)
Considering the wireless channel as a LTI system, the received signal (or output)
y(t) when sending a signal s(t) would be thus
y(t) =
n∑
i=1
ρis(t− τi), (2.28)
a sum of attenuated and delayed version of the input s(t).
2.2.3. Important Parameters for Channel Characterization
The coherence time of a wireless channel, denoted by TC , is defined as the time
interval over which the channel impulse response does not change considerably (in
what order of magnitude is concerned). Basically, this means that the impulse
response for a certain time instant t may be considered constant. A channel is
considered fast fading if the coherence time is much shorter than the time required
for a certain application and slow fading if the opposite occurs. This value depends
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mainly on the Doppler shifts for different paths. The Doppler spread can be defined
as DS := 1/(4Tc). Other definitions are DS = 1/Tc, if we consider only the order of
magnitude to be important for the channel characterization. Typical values for Tc
and DS are 2.5ms and 100Hz, respectively (cf. [TV05]).
The multipath delay spread, Td, is defined as the difference in propagation time
between the longest and the shortest path, when only the main paths, i.e., the paths
with significant energy, are considered. The value of the received signal Er(f, t)
does not only change when t changes by Tc, but also when f chances by 1/(2Td).
Therefore we define the coherence bandwidth, Wc, as Wc := 1/(2Td). Concerning
multipath time delay, if the bandwidth of the input is much less than Wc, then the
channel is said to be flat fading. If the opposite occurs, the channel is said to be
frequency-selective. Typical values for Td and Wc are 1 µs and 500 kHz. More typical
values for these parameters and a detailed explanation of channels and how to model
them can be found in [TV05].
Moreover, several studies based on experimentation and simulation have been
performed in order to evaluate the physical layer parameters for specific situations.
E.g., in [TMB01], the authors use several simulation tools in order to check how
the physical layer affects the performance of a wireless protocol. Curiously enough,
they showed that different simulation tools for the evaluations of wireless network
protocols yield different results, particularly due to different assumptions made at
the physical layers, which they were able to simulate.
Other more complicated models, like the wide-sense stationary-uncorrelated scat-
tering (WSSUS) channel model, commonly employed for the multipath channel ex-
perienced in mobile communications, are investigated in more detail in [SK98].
Braun et al. present in [BD91] a model for the time and frequency selective outdoor
mobile radio channel. According to the authors, their method allows a classification
of real environments into several classes and the extraction of the relevant param-
eters. They performed extensive experimentation in urban, suburban and rural
regions, in hilly and mountainous regions in Switzerland. They experimentally mea-
sured complex impulse responses using two types of correlation receiver equipment:
a narrow-band receiver and a broadband receiver. Furthermore, they showed that
the impulse response contained one big peak corresponding to the direct path and
a few, weak scattered components caused by small scatterers.
There are several other studies that try to characterize the wireless channels th-
rough experimental setups. One important characterization is based on the power
delay profile of a channel, which can be performed in an easy way.
The power delay profile (PDP) (usually expressed in dB) plots the intensity power
of a signal received through a multipath channel as a function of time delay. This
time delay is the difference in travel time between multipath arrivals. This means
that the highest peak will correspond to the main path, possible the line-of-sight
(LOS) path. It is easily measured empirically and can be used to extract certain
channel parameters such as the delay spread. There are expensive devices allowing
this kind of measurements.
In [ZW99], the authors present power delay profile measurements gathered for
the indoor radio propagation channel in the 2.4GHz ISM Band. This is the band
we will use later in our experiments. From the obtained PDP, they subsequently
derived time dispersion parameters for this channel, namely the mean excess delay,
RMS delay spread and maximum excess delay spread, as also defined in that work.
Additionally, they also calculated the coherence bandwidth, Wc, of this channel.
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Interesting values with mean excess delays of around 50 ns and coherence bandwidth
about 700 kHz have been shown.
In their work [ZBN05], Zwick et al. characterized the wireless channel in several
different rooms in four different buildings, from a small office to a library or labo-
ratory by making broad multipath channel propagation measurements at 60GHz.
The measured RMS delay spread ranged between 3 ns and 9 ns.
Similarly, Choi et al. [CGR05] realized a measurement campaign for the charac-
terization at 60GHz of the indoor channel at three different corridors. The RMS
delay spreads were about 10ns.
Traditional methods like signal analyzers and oscilloscopes can be very expensive.
In [MFZ+12], the authors show a very interesting and low-cost method to measure
the channel impulse response (CIR) using less expensive devices, namely Universal
Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) devices. We will in Section 5.2.2 describe this
radio devices in detail, as they were used in our experiments. RMS delay spread
were about 7 ns for a residential area, 6.5 ns for a commercial area and 30.2 ns for
downtown urban areas. These values were obtained in several measurement cam-
paigns.
In [AM94], the authors used a ray-tracing propagation model, as explained in
Section 2.2.1.3, to compute the coherence bandwidth of an urban environment and
the channel’s RMS delay spread.
For more details about modeling the wireless channels as a LTI system, please
refer to Hashemi’s very interesting tutorial-survey paper [Has93]. They present the
theory and a vast set of measurements for indoor systems, as well as an extensive
bibliography about this subject.
As seen before, the channel is responsible for distortion in the original input
signals. This distortion may cause bad effects in the telecommunications systems,
like intersymbol interference (ISI), which may lead to high error rates in digital
communications. Usually, equalizers are designed to compensate for this. In order to
design such an equalizer, one may need to estimate the channel and its corresponding
introduced distortion. The problem of channel estimation or sounding is also very
important in our method for key exchange. Extensive literature has been written on
this subject. In [TTD00], the authors propose a single-user channel estimation and
equalization for LTI channels. Designing an optimal detector or receiver requires
the knowledge of the channel response. Its parameters must therefore be carefully
estimated from training sequences. However, there are channel estimation techniques
which do not require training sequences. Therefore, they were given the name of
blind channel estimation methods. Using these techniques, the channel estimation
is performed while information signals are being transmitted. The intermediate
case is called semi-blind channel estimation, where known symbols and unknown
information data are contained in the same transmitted signal.
2.2.4. Reciprocity Theorem
This theorem requires sophisticated skills in the field of electromagnetics. We will
just briefly mention it in order to get an intuition. The interested reader should
refer to [Bal97] for more details.
Already in [Car29], Carson makes reference to a work from Sommerfeld from
the year 1925 stating that: If A1 and A2 are two antennas located at 01 and 02
respectively, and have arbitrary orientations, and signals are first sent from A1 and
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received by A2 and then sent with the same average power from A2 and received by
A1, then the intensity and phase of the electric field at the receiver A1 will be equal
to that previously produced at A2, regardless of the electrical properties and geometry
of the intervening media and the form of the antennas.
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Figure 2.8.: Illustration of the Reciprocity Property.
Mathematically, if |Es1| = |Es2| and ∠Es1 = ∠Es2, then |Er1| = |Er2| and ∠Er1 =
∠Er2.
Its derivation comes from the Lorentz Reciprocity Theorem. Briefly, this theorem
basically states the following: suppose a current density J1 produces an electric field
E1 and a magnetic field H1. Similarly, a current density J2 produces an electric
field E2 and a magnetic field H2. All these vectors are considered to be periodic
with the same frequency.
For an arbitrary surface S enclosing a volume V, we have that∫
V
[J1 · E2 − E1 · J2] dV =
∮
S
[E1 ×H2 − E2 ×H1] dS.
This is the expression in the integral form. In its differential form, we would have
J1 · E2 − E1 · J2 = ∇ · [E1 ×H2 − E2 ×H1].
This theorem has several applications. It is used, e.g., for proving the reciprocity
for two antennas and for radiation patterns (see [Bal97]).
2.3. Information Reconciliation and Privacy
Amplification
Reciprocity itself may not ensure that the received signals of both parties are to-
tally equal. Noise, small synchronization errors, differences in the used hardware or
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even manufacture difference in similar hardware will be responsible for differences
in the received signals. Therefore, the bitstring generated by these signals on both
communicating parties may be slightly different, as we will show later in Chapter 6,
where the results of our experimental validation are presented.
The problem of generating an equal bitstring from two marginally different strings
in both legitimate parties has been already considered in the domain of the quantum
key agreement and it has been given the name of information reconciliation. In the
case that an attacker knows more than Alice and Bob about each other’s secret
random variable, there is the need, even before the information reconciliation step,
to perform the so-called advantage distillation step, where Alice and Bob, by using
the public channel, can get an advantage over the attacker. We didn’t foresee the
usage of this step in our prototype because, as we will show later in Chapter 6,
Alice and Bob’s information about each other’s generated key, given by their key
agreement rate, has virtually always been higher than Eve’s information.
In order to cope with this issue in our prototype, an implementation of an infor-
mation reconciliation phase has been suggested at the end of the protocol. Since
this step is performed interactively in the public channel, some information is leaked
to a passive eavesdropper.
We straightforwardly used one method for performing information reconciliation,
namely the practical protocol described in detail in [BS93], called CASCADE. This
protocol consists in exchanging parity bits between both parties in the public chan-
nel. This method can be better described as a kind of interactive binary search. As
a drawback of this protocol, it is clear that the more parity bits are exchanged, the
more information an attacker can collect about the secret key. The more bits Alice’s
and Bob’s original bitstring differ in, the more parity bits have to be exchanged in
order to correct this error.
The usage of information reconciliation protocols, namely of CASCADE, in the
context of secret key agreement using antennas, namely with ESPAR Antenna, has
already been suggested in [SIS09]. A detailed study on CASCADE can be found in
[SY00]. More protocols about advantage distillation and information reconciliation
and an analysis of CASCADE can be found in [LvTvD03].
Maurer and Wolf’s 2003 three-part seminal paper on this subject, [MW03a],
[MW03b] and [MW03c], give a deeper and formal insight on this problem.
These authors also studied a similar problem in key distribution, namely the
problem of reducing the partial information that an attacker could have gained about
the key during its generation process. This is achieved by creating a shorter key with
information retrieved from the original key and reducing the information that the
attacker would have gained before. This process is called privacy amplification and is
based on the usage of a universal hash function. Since this technique is not original,
we have not implemented it in our prototype. More details on these kind of functions
can be found in [CW79]. Information reconciliation can also be performed by using
decoders, as done e.g. in [HHY95].
3. Related Work
The possibility of using the intrinsic properties of the wireless channels for imple-
menting security solutions in wireless communication systems was recently disco-
vered and triggered an increasing interest about this subject. Several studies have
been recently elaborated and some different approaches have been presented.
Wireless key exchange can be based on several principles and different approaches
for security at the physical layer have been proposed by different authors.
These methods are considered to provide information-theoretical (unconditional)
security, as no computational assumptions are required for their security.
In this chapter, we present an extensive survey on the distinct approaches for
generating and/or transmitting a shared secret key by leveraging the properties of
lower layers. We will refer to some studies who were elaborated in other contexts
than security, but whose results are used when showing the security of some of the
methods described here, like a few works studying the properties of different wireless
environments.
3.1. Noise-based Methods
Most works mentioned here are predominantly based on the notion of information-
theoretic secrecy capacity of the channels, defined as the maximum achievable secure
rate of communication with a weak secrecy constraint. A deep survey of this subject
can be found, e.g., in [BB11] and [BBRM08].
In 1975, in his seminal paper [Wyn75], Wyner introduced the famous wiretap chan-
nel model. Unlike the most accepted Shannon’s Model for communication proposed
in his work [Sha48], where the channel is assumed to be noiseless, the Wyner’s wire-
tap channel ponders the realistic assumption of a noisy channel. Wyner’s wiretap
channel model consists of two legitimate parties (a transmitter and a receiver) and
an eavesdropper. The channel between the transmitter and the receiver is called
the main channel, whereas the channel between the transmitter and the eavesdrop-
per is called the eavesdropper’s channel. The signal the eavesdropper receives is a
noisy version of the signal received at the legitimate receiver. These methods rely
on the assumption that the noise of the legitimate user’s channel and the noise of
the eavesdropper’s channel are uncorrelated. This gives an opportunity for secret
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communication which will be explored by several other authors, as described in this
section.
This model was extended to a gaussian wiretap channel in [LYCH78]. It conside-
red an additive white-Gaussian noise channel. Hereby the noisy processes over the
main and wiretap (or eavesdropper) channels are independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian over different channel users, with zero mean and variances
σ1 and σ2. If we consider the average power limited to the value P over the trans-
mitted symbols, the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel was shown
to be CM − CMW , where CM is the capacity of the main channel and CMW is the
capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel, which is a concatenation of the main and
wiretap channels. More specifically, the secrecy capacity, CS, was found to be given
by the fundamental expression
CS =
1
2 log(1 + P/σ
2
1)−
1
2 log(1 + P/(σ
1
1 + σ22)).
In [AC91], Ahlswede and Csiszar proposed a source-type and channel-type model
where Alice and Bob share common randomness.
Other information-theoretic approaches extending Maurer’s paper [Mau93] consi-
dered the secrecy capacity of the wireless channels by exchanging information over
the public authenticated feedback channel. It is shown that such a secret key agree-
ment is possible for a scenario in which all three parties receive the output of a
binary symmetric source over independent binary symmetric channels, even when
the enemy’s channel is superior to the other two channels.
In [BR06], Barros and Rodrigues consider the transmission of confidential data
over wireless channels with several communicating parties. First, these authors
define the secrecy capacity in terms of outage probability. Based on this definition,
they provide a complete characterization of the maximum transmission rate at which
the eavesdropper is incapable of reliably decoding any information. The channels are
considered to be quasi-static fading. The keystone is that the channel between both
legitimate parties is independent from the the eavesdropper channel. Their results
are stronger as they require less assumptions about the channel. Contrary to the
results regarding Gaussian wiretap channels (without feedback), Barros shows that
information-theoretic security is achievable even when the eavesdropper has a better
average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than the legitimate receiver, as long as fading
is present. In [BBRM08], the authors prove that information-theoretic security is
achievable even when the eavesdropper’s channel has a better average signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) than the main channel, given quasi-static Rayleigh fading channels.
They summarize this property with the sentence: in what security is concerned,
fading thus turns out to be a friend and not a foe. The key point here is to design
secrecy capacity-achieving channel codes. One thus focuses on finding suitably long
codes that get close to perfect secrecy.
In [CDK11], the authors present what they call a Wireless Information-Theoretic
Security (WITS) scheme. They experimentally confirmed the suitability of their
scheme for an outdoor topology with obstacles in two different situations: Obstructed-
Line-of-Sight (OLOS) and Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS). They explicitly ignored Do-
ppler spread arguing that only a low-speed user movement was considered, i.e., in
practice, a static environment. They claim that the lack of experimental measure-
ments and empirical results threats the reliability of information-theoretic schemes
and their robustness when submitted to real-life conditions and actual wave pro-
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pagation environments. The authors set up an ad hoc network to test their tech-
nique. They used three laptops equipped with embedded 802.11n wireless adapters.
The netSumbler software [net] was employed for the acquisition of average received
power levels.They found an expression for the probability of nonzero secrecy capacity
and outage secrecy capacity. Particularly, they concluded, among other interesting
observations, that dense plantation shadowing leads to strong signal attenuation.
Moreover, they confirmed some intuitional assumptions, namely that a degenera-
tion of the channel topology and characteristics does not totally compromise the
WITS scheme in terms of probability of nonzero secrecy capacity, given that this
degeneration applies for both legitimate receivers and for the eavesdropper. They
claim that the most important aspect in their method is the relative positions of
both users and the attacker.
3.2. Reciprocity-&-Fading-based Methods
Some experimental studies about the correlation of the received signals depending
on the distance of the receiving antennas and on the existence of several scatter-
ers have been performed by Lee [Lee73]. Assuming a Rayleigh distribution for the
receiver signal amplitude and uniform distribution of its phase, a simplified theore-
tical model has been proposed. The experimental results confirmed the theoretical
underpinnings and the intuition that the correlation of the received signal clearly de-
creases with the insertion of scatterers and the distance between the antennas. This
study is about antenna diversity and multipath interference and tries to explain the
conditions under which there is significant advantage of using several antennas for
a more efficient message transmission. Accordingly, a correlation of 0.7 or less is
needed to obtain an advantage of antenna diversity. We can extrapolate for our case
of fading-based key exchange and conclude that an attacker would receive, under
certain conditions detailed in [Lee73], an uncorrelated signal from the one the legiti-
mate parties receive. The theoretical prediction, including noisy signals, still agrees
with the experiments. This noise is mainly due to the receivers. It is mentioned
that in a city with tall buildings, the correlation between the signals obtained would
be expected to be much lower.
Generally, channel sounding techniques have been already proposed in [RM93] for
other purposes than security systems. Usually, the channel is described in terms of
average delay, delay spread and coherence bandwidth. All these parameters give rele-
vant information needed for the design of communication system. Channel sounding
is a method for collecting this information for a communication’s path and frequency
range. In this paper, experiments under different environments were performed in
order to calculate the path loss. The path loss was even determined for different
moments in time. The difference between the results for April and May were clear.
This was supposedly due to the development of new leaves and full foliage. Losses
were determined to increase with frequency. This should be due to the fact that the
dimensions of the leaves were very close to the value of a wavelength at the used
frequency of 2.0GHz.
However, the very first idea of using reciprocity combined with multipath inter-
ference as an opportunity for creating and sharing a cryptographic secret key first
came up in 1995 in Hershey, Hassan and Yarlagadda’s landmark paper [HHY95] on
keying variable management. They basically suggested to use the characteristics of
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an urban UHF radio channel, which could be determined by what they called mutual
sounding. This is basically a way of measuring the impulse response of a channel,
which they designated as cryptovariable. More concretely, the authors proposed a
protocol where Alice and Bob send each other a suite of tones with a certain phase
and amplitude. The relative phase information is then quantized. The usage of de-
coders on both parties is considered in order to get the agreement in slightly different
keys, as mentioned in the section about information reconciliation (see Section 2.3).
The security of this protocol refers to detailed investigations by Jakes [Jak74] on the
probability distributions of the phase difference at two frequencies. This depends
on the environment and an attacker should, accordingly, receive uncorrelated tone
phases if its distance to the legitimate parties is large enough.
This idea was extended in [HSHC96]. In this work, the authors also propose
to use the reciprocity of the channel and the rapid spatial decorrelation of phase
in the radio channel as the main features for the purpose of key exchange. The
presence of thermal noise as a source of errors between the generated keys was also
analyzed. Again, the authors proposed the usage of a channel decoder to deal with
this problem. A simulation was presented in order to evaluate the performance of a
Golay code in establishing a 64-bit long secret key.
In [KHC00], the authors propose to probe the response of the channel. Accord-
ingly, the sender of the message should adapt the sending phases in order to com-
pensate for the difference in phases introduced by the channel and measured by
the sender. This technique makes no use of a secret key to ensure secrecy. They
claimed again that two receivers located far enough away from each other in a com-
plex enough environment receive uncorrelated signals [OOKF68] due to reflections
and interference of signals propagating through different paths. As stated previously,
rapid spatial decorrelation is the basis of a few schemes used for key exchange. Some
rules-of-thumb were established in order to characterize how far both receivers should
be separated from each other and how complex the environmental conditions should
be. Keeping this in mind, unconditional security from fading channels is exploited
further in [TM01]. The authors present the first practical unconditionally secure
system for a key exchange over a wireless link. They claim that statistical inde-
pendence between Bob and Eve’s signals occurs when these parties are separated
by more than 10 to 100 wavelengths, depending on the fading channel characte-
ristics. If Eve is not able to examine the changing channel attenuation between
Alice’s antenna and Bob’s antenna, then she won’t be able find the secret key. It
was assumed in this work that fading is characterized only by lognormal shadowing.
The authors claim however that their method should work also with other kinds
of fading models. It is also mentioned that Eve’s correlation depends on how close
her antenna is to the legitimate parties’ antennas, the RF band employed and the
multipath characteristics of the channel. Their three-way handshake protocol has
the disadvantage of requiring a RNG for the first step. Also a Forward Error Cor-
rection (FEC) coder is employed, as well as cryptographically secure hash functions.
This clearly makes it unsuitable for light-weight applications. It is mentioned that
the protocol lacks authentication, which makes it vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
attacks. They also firstly identified the possibility of Eve, although unlikely, influ-
encing or manipulating the environment in such a way that she could deduce the
secret key. We explore this subject in our work in more detail later. Thermal noise
is also mentioned. It is stated that in addition to unconditionally secure protocols,
one may think about also employing conventional public-key methods, in order to
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achieve secure communication.
In [SP08], the authors suggest that there is an optimum transmit power, and an
optimum quantization strategy, that minimizes the energy consumption for a given
key size. The emphasis is on exploiting the wideband wireless channels for generation
of large secret keys. An important parameter is introduced, namely the probability
p(SINR,M), that both Alice and Bob originate the same quantization index for a
particular phase as a function of the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR)
and the number of quantization levels (M). This variable is then used in order to
calculate the minimum energy consumption for a successful key acquisition.
In [LDS12], the authors compare a few key extraction methods based both on
entire channel state information (CSI) and on single channel parameter such as
the received signal strength indicator (RSSI). They claim that the reduction in the
degree-of-freedom when going from CSI to RSSI decreases the rate of the key ex-
traction. They therefore suggest to make CSI information available to higher layers,
where security is normally managed. They also identify the random amplitudes and
phases of the channel response of wireless multipath fading channels as a source of
naturally occurring randomness that would satisfy three important properties: ea-
sily and widely accessible, high level of randomness and difficult for Eve to observe.
In a rich multipath environment wireless channels have high spatial and tempo-
ral variation, meaning there is a constant surge of new randomness that one can
use to extract new and independent key bits. An Orthogonal Frequency Division
Multiplexing (OFDM) system is explored from the perspective of key generation.
Moreover, it is mentioned that the frequency generated by local oscillators continu-
ously fluctuates (or drifts) around its center frequency, originating a time dependent
phase drift. For their purposes, the authors considered the phase offset caused by
oscillator frequency drift as negligible during each channel sounding. However, in
our work, we used this drift as a source of common randomness (see Chapter 5).
After a couple of theoretical studies in this area, there was still a lack of an imple-
mentation of radio reciprocity-based key exchange schemes. This drew the attention
of the community to the implementation of a few practical setups performing this
protocol. In all of them, the authors present different key extractors (see Section
5.3) for generating the key from the received signal, given that some non-reciprocities
(like different hardware employed or additive noise) strongly influence the final re-
sult ([MTM+08]). At this point, these non-reciprocities were seen as a problem for
a perfect key establishment. In our work, we use instead the opportunity arising
from this new source of randomness to augment the extracted entropy. Hence, most
of the recent research focuses on finding stable and efficient key quantizers that deal
with these impairments ([CPK10] and [PJC+13]).
One of the first practical implementation of key establishment schemes have been
proposed in the seminal work by Lee et al. ([LXMT06]). Apart from their implemen-
tation, they additionally claim to reach confidentiality and authenticity of protocol
parties, which therefore allows to detect spoofing attacks by using the characteristics
of the physical channel. They called this technique the channel-based authentication.
The principle is basically the same as the one employed for key exchange purposes: it
is assumed that Alice and Bob had previously sounded the channel and subsequently
both know the channel responses hAB(t) and hBA(t). This initial link is assumed
to be established using traditional higher-layer authentication procedures. Later,
Eve tries to masquerade as Alice. Bob asks Eve to send the signal and compares
the received signal h˜(t) with hAB(t). If Eve is located somewhere else, h˜(t) will be
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different enough from hAB(t). This way, Bob realizes that this party is not Alice.
Two methods for channel sounding were proposed: Temporal (Pulse-type) probing,
where the usage of probing methods are suggested to construct channel estimates
for authentication, as RF pulsing or spread spectrum methods; and Multiple Tone
Probing, where different multiple, simultaneous carrier waves are sent, being the
carrier frequencies fi by an amount bigger than the channel coherence bandwidth to
ensure independent fading across them. Finally, they proposed the keys to be given
by KA = f(hBA) and KB = f(hAB), where f is a cryptographic one-way function.
Another solution would be to use these two values as a mask for the distribution of
some chosen random bitstring chosen to be the private key. Simultaneously, they
present experimental results using a USRP [USR] device deployed in the 400MHz
band interacting with the GNU Radio software [gnu]. The oscillator drift has once
again been mentioned as a negative effect forcing the authors to use merely the
magnitude of the gains. As previously mentioned, by exploiting this drift, we were
able to harvest more common randomness (see Chapter 5) in our work .
In [ASKMY07], Azimi-Sadjadi et al. use signal envelope as the source from which
to extract the cryptographic key. They explore the deep fades of the signal to extract
correlated bitstrings and introduce a new method called secure fuzzy information
reconciliators to generate a robust key. They present a study based on the simulation
of the wireless channel that confirms their approach. The authors also proposed to
make practical measurements in the frequency domain. An experiment has been
done in line-of-sight (LOS) and the reciprocity property has been confirmed. They
claim that the fact of considering only the deep fades instead of the entire envelope
allows this method to be more resistant to interference. Error-correction techniques
are applied to correct noise errors and filtering to correct chattering.
Consequently, searching better algorithms for bit extraction became the main re-
search direction. In their seminal paper, Mathur et al. [MTM+08] presented a new
algorithm to extract shared secret bits from the environment. They use a technique
combining level-crossings and quantization. They achieved an error-free key estab-
lishment rate of approximately 1 bit/sec using off-the-shelf 802.11 hardware in a
indoor wireless environment. These hardware platforms use coarse per-packet RSSI
information. To the best of our knowledge, the authors were the first to evaluate
the randomness of the bit-sequences produced by their method, showing they are
suitable for the use as cryptographic keys. They used for this purpose the NIST test
suite [BRS+10] and Maurer’s universal statistical test for checking the entropy of
the obtained sequences. The deployed radios are half-duplex due to hardware con-
straints. It was observed that in the time between two successive probes, the channel
slightly changes. The channel estimates are quite correlated if the difference in time
for different probings is very small. The authors firstly present the properties of
a good key: suitably long and statistically random - accordingly, the bits should
not show any statistical patterns that could be explored by an attacker. They first
introduced the idea of studying the randomness of the generated bits and proposed
the usage of statistical tests to test for various defects. They address the problem of
estimating the trade-off between probability of error and rate of generation of secret
bits using the level-crossings method. An important conclusion arising from their
studies was that the order of secret-bit rate should not be expected to be great than
the order of the maximum Doppler frequency for a certain threshold method. They
also pointed out that in practice this value of key generation rate also depends on
the channel probing rate, i.e. how quick both legitimate parties are able to send each
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other probing signals. For experimental validation, the authors used themagnitude
of the tallest peak in the CIR, which corresponds to the dominant multipath as
the parameters of interest. The practical results showed that the algorithm performs
very well both in static as in mobile setups. One of the drawbacks of this method is
that the variation in average signal power produces long strings of ones and zeros,
which basically means that the extracted entropy of the algorithm is too low and,
subsequently, that an adversary would be able to easily guess the key and break
the system. The authors explained this fact by saying that they are trying to in-
clude the effect of shadow fading (large-scale fading), which produces large but slow
changes in the average signal power, used in the key extraction method. In order to
cope with this problem, they subtracted an average of each trace from the original
trace, which leaves only the small scale fading (see Section 2.2), corresponding to
faster variations of the signal. The authors also explained how to act in the case
where interference is present. According to them, this problem could be obviated
by reducing the quantization levels in order to achieve improved robustness in the
key generation process at the cost of lowering the key generation rate. We also deal
with this issue in our work (see Chapter 6).
The idea of joint randomness not shared by others (JRNSO), where the communi-
cating entities generate JRNSO bits from a channel impulse response (CIR) estimate
using the JRNSO-bits for the generation of an encryption key, has already been pre-
sented [YMR+09]. Theoretical models have been proposed and the secret key rate
has been indicated for different values of the signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio for a ba-
sic scenario. An improved system based on over-quantization has been introduced.
The authors experimentally achieved the value on the order of 10 bit/sec of key
generation rate.
Other authors, like Premnath et al. [PJC+13], focused their efforts on evaluating
the effectiveness of secret key extraction using RSS intensity values for the channel
characteristics. Again, they used the idea that the time variation of the RSS values
can be measured using off-the-shelf equipment on a per frame basis and later quan-
tized. They showed that, under certain environments, the entropy might be too low
due to lack of dynamic variations of the wireless channel, which is also a problem
that we developed later in our work in Section 4.1. Moreover, they also observed
that an adversary can cause predictable key generation in these environments. They
sustained that high entropy is reached easily in a dynamic environment or when the
devices are mobile. The NIST test suite is used for the randomness tests of the
conducted experiments. We also used this suite in our work for similar purposes
(see Section 6.3.3.3). They also implemented their extraction method in hand-held
devices phones and in a MIMO-like sensor network. This last case gave raise to
a high bit mismatch. In this work, the asymmetry and limited capabilities of the
wireless hardware are mentioned as a drawback to the key generation process under
real settings. The attacker is assumed to be only passive and is not able to jam
the communication. Moreover the man-in-the-middle attack is not considered. Also
very interesting is mentioning the possibility of authenticating the wireless devices
by using certain physical and radiometric properties. The authors observe that dif-
ferent RSS quantizers have been proposed in the existing literature. They claim that
the main difference among them consists in the number of thresholds and their value.
The authors point out some causes for the mismatch in the obtained key bitstrings,
such as presence of noise and interference, hardware limitations, manufacturing vari-
ations, vendor-specific differences, including differences in implementing automatic
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gain control, and the lack of sampling at the same time, i.e., synchronization issues
due to the half-duplex mode of communication in commercial transceivers. The
CASCADE protocol is used for information reconciliation (cf. Section 2.3). The
authors firstly present three performance metrics for the quality of the key:
1. Entropy: estimated using the NIST test suite’s approximate entropy test;
2. Bit Mismatch Rate: ratio of different bits extracted from RSS quantization
between Alice and Bob to the the total number of extracted bits;
3. Secret Bit Rate: average number of secret bits extracted per collected measure-
ment after considering bit losses due to information reconciliation and privacy
amplification.
Once again, it is mentioned that there is a trade-off between extracted entropy and
bit rate. Their extractor algorithm, called Adaptive Secret Big Generation (ASBG),
basically builds upon the one described in [MTM+08]. The main difference resides
in the fact that the RSS measurements are divided into smaller blocks, for which the
mean values and the thresholds are calculated separately. This allows the quantizer
to adapt to the slow variations of RSS. Experiment validation was performed using
wireless network cards operating in the 802.11g mode. Once again, RSS on a per
frame basis was used to measure the variation of the wireless channel. The wireless
card drivers report the RSS values as integers, and it is known that the calculation
of RSS is vendor dependent. Each of the RSS measurements is quantized into one
or more bits for secret key extraction. The environments tested were of three dif-
ferent types: stationary, mobile and intermediate. In a stationary environment, the
authors found out that the variations of Alice and Bob’s signals are primarily due
to the hardware imperfections and thermal effects, as both effects aren’t symmetric.
Moreover, they claim RSS measurements in this type of environment contain very
low inherent entropy. It is not possible, according to them, to extract secret bits at
a fast rate in this type of setting. They achieved a rate of 7 to 8 minutes to generate
a 256-bit secret key, which is very inefficient. In a mobile setting, a high degree
of reciprocity was observed. The same satisfying degree of reciprocity and entropy
was achieved in a place with several mobile intermediate objects. They proposed an
attack on stationary environments. They called it the predictable channel attack. In
a certain way, this attack has some common points with the one we had proposed
in our 2010 paper [DLMdA10] and presented in Chapter 4. They claim that an
adversary can cause predictable changes in a stationary environment and therefore
inducing certain predictable values to the generated key. Moreover, the authors
perform experiments with heterogeneous devices. They showed that despite bigger
mismatching rate, secret key extraction is still reasonably possible due to the infor-
mation reconciliation step. The authors benchmark their results in a comparison
between the results in [ASKMY07],[MTM+08], [TM01] and [AHT+05b].
In [CPK10], Croft et al. extracted a secret key from a wireless environment despite
the existence of real-world non-reciprocities. They further studied the trade-off be-
tween bit generation rate and bit disagreement rates. They presented a scheme using
a ranking method to remove the non-reciprocities due specially to the transceiver
hardware characteristics. Their method makes up for the difference in the trans-
mit powers and RSSI circuit variations. Variations of scale are observed even with
identical hardware. This is even more true with different hardware. This method
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allows the extraction of 40 bits/second for the key generation. Some of the non-
reciprocities sources mentioned are the additive noise and differences in hardware,
and they are the cause of bit disagreement. They propose a method they called
adaptive ranking-based uncorrelated bit extraction (ARUBE), which consists of two
stages: interpolation, which removes non-reciprocities caused by the half-duplex
nature of the channel; and ranking, during which the non-reciprocities caused by
differences in the hardware characteristics are reduced. Each receiver actually mea-
sures the RSSI, as many of the off-the-shelf equipment available in the market. This
value has known to present an affine relationship with the channel gain, CG, i.e.,
RSSI = c1CG + c0, where c1 and c0 depend on the two nodes, and they originate
on the difference between hardware brands or manufacturing differences in identical
hardware. Such values are considered to be constant over the short periods of time
required to generate a key from the channel (tens of seconds). In the quantiza-
tion step, the authors also reinforce the notion that there is a trade-off between the
probability of bit disagreement and the number of bits generated. Some experiments
were performed in order to test their setup. Additionally, a very interesting study
on the computational complexity of this method was performed and it was shown
that is significantly smaller than that of the Diffie-Hellman traditional key exchange
method, which requires the repetitive use of modular exponentiation. An entropy
rate above 0.97 was achieved.
Wilson, Tse and Scholtz in [WTS07] put forward an idea to use the ultrawideband
(UWB) channel pulse response between two transceiver as a source of common
randomness using UWB channel models. They presented simulation results in order
to determine the feasible key lengths and success rates of channel identification for
UWB indoor channels. Indoor experiments have been performed and the timing
synchronization error is pointed as a source of error. They claim that empirical
studies of correlation between channel impulse responses under different conditions
are critical in understanding how secure the system is. More study of the potential
ability of enemy terminals to break the system is required. They also used the bit
mismatch as a measure of the quality of their method. They obtained values from
50% up to 70% for the eavesdropper.
The problem of analyzing the physical layer in more detail has also been ap-
proached in [AP09]. The main goal of their work was to study the effect of shad-
owing. For this purpose, they employed a channel measurement system in a set
of different environments. Path losses are extensively modelled and experimentally
tested. They claim that the probability of path failure is strongly underestimated: a
factor of two or higher in the current shadowing models is estimated for the under-
estimation. Measurements take place using Crossbow TelosB wireless sensor devices
[cro] and are performed in open air environment characterized by having dense veg-
etation. RSS values are used for referring to the intensity of the signal. The devices
operated in the 900MHz and 2.4GHz bands.
In [ZCP+14], the authors proposed a new system architecture for the secret key
establishment problem which is also suitable for resource-constrained platforms. It
is clear that a random number generator is a critical component in every crypto-
graphic device. Therefore, an important security feature of the entire system design
is a statistical test to provide entropy testing. Again, the authors proposed a method
for online entropy estimation using NIST tests as in [BRS+10]. They identify and
clarify potential failure sources in reciprocal channel estimations, such as bad syn-
chronization, noise, nonlinearities, and too rapid movement. The authors conclude
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that, unlike CASCADE [BS93], no information of the key material would be revealed
if one uses the transmission of syndromes of binary codes during the information
reconciliation phase of the protocol. Particularly, they applied BCH syndrome de-
coding for this purpose.
Further, the authors extended this idea by combining physical layer techniques
and asymmetric cryptography [ZAW+14] in order to strengthen the overall system.
3.3. Antenna-based Methods
Other methods for key establishment have been proposed. The following methods
are based on antenna diversity. They can be classified into Time-Varying Radiation
Pattern Antennas, where the radiation pattern is technically manipulated in order
to change with time, and variation in the number of used antennas.
3.3.1. Time-Varying Radiation Pattern Antennas
Other solutions were developed in order to achieve a secure key exchange even in the
case when the environment is not complex enough or does not change sufficiently
with time. The core idea is to create an artificial change in the environment by
changing the radiation pattern in a controlled way during the transmission and
reception of the probing signals.
In this context, the use of a very peculiar time-varying radiation pattern antennas
was reported, as described in [AHT+05a, Ohi05, SHOK04]. The working principle
of these antennas is presented in more detail in [SHOK04]. They are based on the
Harrington’s Reactively Controlled Array. This kind of antenna consists of an active
dipole surrounded by six parasitic dipoles loaded with reactances. It has been first
presented in 1978 [Har78].
The Electrically Steerable Parasitic Array Radiator (ESPAR) is a modified version
of the Harrington Array in the sense that monopoles, instead of dipoles, are used,
and the variable reactive loads (also called varactors) are integrated in the ground
plane. These antennas have been thoroughly investigated for low-cost and small
analog adaptive beamforming purposes.
We can define a m-Element ESPAR as an antenna with one active monopole and
m − 1 passive or parasitic elements. These parasites are not directly connected
to the transceiver circuit but simply terminated with independent variable reactors
or varactors. Some control logic, using a microcontroller, is associated with the
varactors, which allows to control their capacities. These varactors are a type of
tunable load. A varactor diode, also known as varicap, has a variable capacity
depending on the voltage applied across its terminals. This has, of course, influence
on the radiation pattern produced by the array.
In [KO05] Kawakami et al. give deeper details about the functioning of this an-
tenna. Radiation patterns are presented for different adjustable characteristics of
these kind of antennas. A passive element located around an active element is loaded
by a varactor, implemented with a reverse-bias varactor diode. Different configu-
rations for the ground plane are studied. It is shown that the maximum gain in
the horizontal direction is obtained for a radius of the circular ground plane about
0.5λ, where λ is the wavelength of the electromagnetic wave, and the length of the
skirt about 0.25λ for the monopole variant and for seven-element ESPAR antennas,
where each passive element is 0.25λ length.
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In [SHOK04], Shun et al. further developed the subject of ESPAR antennas. They
claim that its low-power consumption attributes, ease of fabrication and its fast
beamforming ability makes them quite suitable for mass deployment. The theory of
ESPAR antennas is presented in detail, its signal model and its adaptive beamform-
ing algorithm performance is analyzed with simulation and experimental methods.
They showed that ESPAR antennas are suitable for ad hoc networks or WLAN ap-
plications, where the performance is mainly influenced by the interferences from the
neighboring mobile terminals, like laptops.
Taillefer et al. in [TC07] describe in detail the functioning of the ESPAR antennas
and specifically how to electronically steer beams and nulls of the radiation pattern
in different directions. The usage of Direction of Arrival (DoA) methods allowing
high precision and resolution estimation of an incoming source are explained and a
signal model for this purpose is presented.
In [HHO05], the authors present a technique for designing a miniature of the con-
ventional ESPAR antenna, being used as a direction finder. They employ a special
technique consisting in immersing the central active element in a dielectric cylinder,
being the parasitic element at the circumference of the cylinder, and decreasing the
radius of the ground plane to that of the circumference. Measurements results are
shown for a frequency of 2.484GHz. Measured and simulation results were shown
to be identical. An improvement of the performance in comparison with traditional
antennas was obtained.
In [Ohi05], Ohira proposes the usage of ESPAR antennas in order to achieve
time variation in the transmitted (or received) signal amplitudes for the purpose of
establishing a common secret key between two parties. He claims that this antenna
increases the spatial randomness that can never be predicted in practice by any other
party and presents some proof-of-concept experiments in an indoor environment.
The eavesdropper is even given the possibility of having a high-gain antenna to
pick up the wave leakage. In [Ohi05], the idea of leakage is unfortunately not
explored deeper and it is not totally clear if it is meant the reradiation or simply
the signal that both legitimate parties send. In Chapter 4, we focus on the detailed
study of how to use the passive reradiation by both Alice and Bob to recover the
key. The ESPAR antenna is considered to equip an access point (AP), whereas
the user terminal (UT) has a simple omnidirectional antenna. The AP and UT
emit constant-amplitude waves. The same frequency is used in both directions,
using time division multiplexing (TDD). In detail, the AP transmits a constant
amplitude wave not carrying any key information while simultaneously controlling
the varactors randomly. The RF signal source excites the main radiator, which
induces a coherent current on each parasite element through electromagnetic mutual
coupling among them. The antenna therefore works as a phased array. Next, the
UT transmits back a signal. Important here is that the AP receives the incoming
signal while controlling the varactors again in the same way. This means that the
radiation diagram variation is the same during transmission and reception of the
channel probe signal. Experiments were performed in a metal-walled room causing
different multipath reflections. The body of the person in charge of measurements
provides a time-varying condition. Thermal noise is mentioned already a a source
of discrepancy. To cope with this, a threshold of 2 dB range was considered, inside
of which the generated bits would be ignored, in a signal with approximately 20 dB
span. A drawback of this method is that the microcontroller randomly steering the
varactors should be able to generate randomness by itself in the chip.
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In their seminal work [AHT+05a], Aono et al. proposed to explicitly use ESPAR
antenna and its beam-forming capabilities in order to increase the fluctuation of the
radio channel characteristics. Experimental validation was performed and they were
able to extract robust secret keys from the received signal strength indicator (RSSI)
profile. As a motivation, they postulate that it would be easy to break the secret
keys under an environment with a small fluctuation of the channel characteristics and
propose the usage of smart antennas in order to vary electronically the fluctuation of
channel characteristics. They mentioned that digital beam-forming array antennas
require elaborate control circuits and a considerable amount of power, making them
not suitable for commercial solutions. The gain of an ESPAR antenna is about 6
dBi. For a 8-bit resolution control voltage, the number of radiation patterns that
an m-element ESPAR antenna can form is, according to the authors, (28)m−1 = 248,
with m = 7. The key generation process is described in detail: the ESPAR antenna
access point (AP) fixes a beam pattern during a certain period of time where she
transmits a series of packets. Bob (user terminal - UT) receives these packets and
calculates their RSSI values. Bob will send some packets back while Alice keeps the
beam pattern constant. She also calculates the RSSI profile. Alice changes the beam
pattern and the procedure is repeated. The binary quantization is quite simple: a
threshold value is defined and all values under this threshold are considered to be
0; all values over this threshold are considered to be 1. It is mentioned that a small
number of beam patters will allow an eavesdropper located near the access point to
be able to deduce information by near-field probing of the ESPAR antenna, which
allows him to find out the beam pattern. The number of beam patterns, 248, and
the presence time of a beam pattern of few milliseconds makes it much difficult for
an eavesdropper to deduce this information. Experiments with 1mW power and
a frequency of 2.4GHz were performed. The bit disagreement has been used as a
quality measure of this technique. A low disagreement rate was observed between
the AP and the UT, whereas between the UT and the eavesdropper the opposite
happens. It is shown that the technique also works under a dynamic environment
and also under different heights for the AP to the other parties. The keys between
the UT and the eavesdropper were observed to be sufficiently independent.
Imai et al. [IKM06] build upon the work of Aono [AHT+05a]. They claim Aono’s
method still lacks a rigorous security analysis. In order to cope with this issue,
they present a complete security analysis for the scheme. Only passive attacks are
considered. However, their setup works under the condition that an attacker does
not obtain more information on the data exchanged by the legitimate parties than
a certain threshold. They recommend only to use this technique in a protected
environment, such as offices with restricted access. The attacker would be assumed
to be out of that room. They point out that an attacker could get enough information
in the case that the environment is a simple cube made of some material with known
electromagnetic properties and containing just the parties and himself inside. He
could be able to simulate the wave propagation in this environment and guess the
key. Though, the environment was very simple and no objects were considered. Still,
in the case that an ESPAR with a true random generation is used, this attack will
not work.
In [KYL08], Hashimoto et al. recall the usage of the ESPAR antenna and give
a detailed description of the protocol for key exchange. They present a few expe-
riments in an indoor environment and use the results of the experiments and also
computer simulation in order to compare the error-correcting codes concerning key
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disagreement using the mutual information extracted from the environment.
3.3.2. Multiple Antennas
Other methods for secret key establishment are based on the simultaneous usage of
several antennas. Antenna diversity is a technique employed in telecommunications
to mitigate the lateral effects of the multipath channel. Due to deep fade, as previ-
ously explained in Section 2.2, it can happen that the incoming signal may be too
low. The usage of a set of multiple antennas allows that at least one antennas receives
a copy of the signal with enough energy to be correctly demodulated.However, lately,
their usage for the purpose of key establishment has also been seriously considered.
Thorough information about antenna diversity can be found in [VA87].
A complete introduction to the theory of MIMO (multiple-input multiple-output)
can also be found in [TV05] and [GSS+03]. MIMO systems make use of many
antennas and is explored by 4G technologies and IEEE 802.11n for most recent
standards in LANs and cellular networks. In [LCR05] and [LR05], Li et al. explore
the redundancy of array transmissions using MIMO to make sure that Eve cannot
perform blind identification. The sender is assumed to have several antennas and
the propagation channel to be Rayleigh flat fading. An attacker is also given the
possibility of using multiple receiving antennas. Multipath interference is assumed to
be available and the channel difference is exploited, rather than the noise difference,
in order to achieve information-theoretic secrecy.
Other methods using MIMO systems were proposed to enhance security [KV08].
The usage of the inherent properties of MIMO channels has been suggested, as well
as some characteristics from the different parties, to ensure security under certain
conditions, as described in detail in [GN05] and [KV08].
In [LHR06] and, in more detail, in [LHR07], Li, Hwu and Ratazzi suggest to use
an array redundancy-based approach with low probability of interception (LPI) as
an approach for physical-layer security. Accordingly, spread spectrum techniques
are the most widely used techniques for low probability of interception/detection
(LPI/LPD). Using J antennas, Alice sends to Bob a symbol sequence b(n) assumed
to be independent identically and uniformly distributed with zero-mean and unit
variance. Alice wants to transmit a symbol sequence b(n) to Bob. h is the channel
response for the channel between Alice and Bob and (.)H represents the Hermitian
of the matrix. With a transmit-beamforming-like scheme, Alice transmits s(n) =
w(n)b(n), where wi(n) denotes the weighting coefficient of the i-th transmit antenna
during the symbol interval n. Bob, equipped with one antenna, will receive x(n) =
hHs(n) whereas Eve, equipped with M antennas, gets xe(n) = Hes(n) + ve(n),
with h being a J × 1 channel vector, He of M × J . h and H are assumed to
be different, due to multipath interference, and Eve is assumed not to know these
values. In order to prevent Eve from estimating the channel between Alice and
Bob, no training sequence should be transmitted. A strategy for the transmission
and receiving procedure from Alice to Bob is explained. The goal is to calculate
w(n) from the estimation of the channel h in order to prevent Eve from performing
blind deconvolution. A strategy for this is presented in their paper, as well as some
simulations and experiments.
Some authors extended the ideas of Section 3.1 to the case of multiple antennas.
In [LP07], Liu and Poor made a similar approach to secrecy as the one explained
in Section 3.1. They propose outer and inner bounds on the secrecy capacity region
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of a generally non-degraded Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages
for two users, where the transmitter has t antennas and each user has one single
antenna. They proposed to use the so-called dirty-paper secure coding strategy in
order to achieve the secrecy capacity region of this particular channel.
In [NG05], Negi and Goel proposed an ingenious method for secret communication.
The idea is to introduce artificial noise in the message such that the receiver’s channel
is not affected. This could be done when the transmitter has several antennas or
one single antenna, but a few so-called “helper” nodes are available. The knowledge
about the eavesdropper’s location is not assumed and the secrecy of this scheme
does not depend on the secrecy of the channel characteristics. In all situations, it
is assumed that the eavesdropper has only one antenna. The idea is to transmit
artificial noise in the null space of the intended receiver’s channel, thus not affecting
the legitimate receiver, rather only the eavesdropper’s channel. For the case of
several helper nodes, the key point is that the helper nodes transmit a weighted signal
whose contribution will cancel just at the intended receiver while the transmitter is
transmitting the secret signal.
This work has been extended to the case where there are several colluding eaves-
droppers, which can be modeled has an adversary with multiple antennas. In [GN05],
it is assumed that the channel state information (CSI) is publicly available and can-
not be used to obtain a secret key. Furthermore, it is also not required that the
eavesdropper’s channel is worse than the legitimate channel. The key idea is quite
similar to the one presented in [NG05]: add artificial noise to the information sig-
nal such that it lies in the null space of the receiver’s channel. The effect of the
number of antennas at the receiver, NR, and at the eavesdropper, NE, is considered,
and the number of transmit antennas, NT , is taken constant. For the case when
NR = NE, the secrecy capacity attains a maximum at a value of NR < NT . In this
case, it is shown that even if the eavesdropper comes closer to the transmitter, secret
communication is still possible.
In [KV08], the authors develop the previous studies by pondering the case where
NR = NT = NE. The eavesdropper’s channel is even consider to have a higher signal
to noise ratio (SNR) than the legitimate channel. Hereby it is proposed that the
transmitter uses a singular value decomposition of the legitimate channel matrix,
perform a low density parity check (LDPC) encoding of the date and add artificial
noise. The single column vectors of the channel matrix seen by the eavesdropper
are not orthogonal to one another; therefore, the received signal corresponding to
each transmitted signal is corrupted by the channel noise and by the projections of
the other transmitted signals. This is called interchannel interference. This effect
increases with the number of used antennas.
Methods to decorrelate two closely spaced monopoles for MIMO can be found in
[DBR05].
In [KWWE07], Khisti et al. generalize the Wyner’s wiretap channel [Wyn75]
for secret-key distribution over wireless links to the case when the sender, the re-
ceiver and the eavesdropper have multiple antennas and an upper-bound on secrecy-
capacity for any SNR for the MISO case (when the receiver has only one antenna)
is calculated.
The case of SIMO (single input, multiple output) is analyzed by Khisti et al.
in [PB05]. They conclude that the use of multiple receive antennas provides an
advantage with respect to a single-antenna channel. The authors extend this work
and analyze the MIMOME (multiple input, multiple output, multiple eavesdropper)
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wiretap channel in [KW10]. In these cases, all parties are equipped with an array
of antennas. The secrecy capacity of the MIMOME channel is found and analyzed.
They characterize the case when an eavesdropper oppose the possibility of secure
communication by making the secrecy capacity to be zero.
3.4. Jamming-based Methods
Jamming is usually considered to be a malicious technique developed to destroy a
legitimate communication between two parties by lowering their SNR. The oppo-
nents basically introduce noise in the same frequency band that the communicating
parties are using. Spread spectrum is a common technique employed by the users to
avoid or reduce the influence of jamming, as an attacker would have to emit signals
in much broader bands. Lately, the possibility of using jamming for the purpose
of key establishment has been pondered. Jamming-based methods make use of this
usually “bad intentional” technique in order to obtain secrecy. The main idea is to
try to degrade the eavesdropper’s channel in order to achieve a higher SNR for the
legitimate users than for the eavesdropper.
In [TY07], the authors consider the general gaussian multiple access wire-tap chan-
nel. Achievable rates and outer bounds on secrecy capacity for certain scenarios have
been established and it has been shown that the multiple-access nature of the chan-
nel can be used for secrecy purposes. A method called cooperative jamming has been
introduced in order to increase the achievable secret rate. This is done by enforcing
some users to jam the eavesdropper’s channel.
The key idea of [JYK+07] is to make the eavesdropper incapable of decoding the
secret wireless message. The scenario uses two access points that are assumed to
be connected through a secure (e.g. wired) connection. This method has been given
the name Shout to Secure. The intentional induction of noise-like interference has
been proposed. One more legitimate party is needed in this scenario - usually called
Carol. Consider that Bob and Carol are connected via a wired communication.
Alice wants to transmit securely, while Eve is trying to eavesdrop the signal. Carol
should firstly give Bob a random sequence and then “shout out” that same signal,
while Alice is transmitting. While interference is created, Bob is the only party
capable of extracting Alice’s signal. There has been a shift of the problem of key
distribution between Alice and Bob to a problem between Bob and Carol. Quantum
cryptography could be used for the alternative secure connection. However, it is
pointed out that this scheme has a problem when Eve is equipped with a high
directional antenna (see Section 2.1.1). She could point it directly to Alice, avoiding
the interferences.
Further jamming-based techniques are presented in [XTZW05]. It is claimed that
no single measurement is sufficient for reliably classifying the presence of a jammer.
This requires enhanced detection schemes that can remove ambiguity when detecting
a jammer. Several attack strategies that a jammer can perform have been introduced
and some models have been proposed. A few statistics for detecting this jamming
attacks have been presented. They are based on detecting anomalies regarding the
normal behavior in the channel based on different features of the signal:
• signal strength: based on RSSI measurements;
• carrier sensing time: the time the channel seems to be busy is measured;
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• packet delivery ratio: the ratio of packets that are successfully delivered to
a destination compared to the total number of packets sent. It can be com-
puted at the receiver by calculating the ratio of the number of packets that
pass the CRC check, or at the sender by having the receiver send back an
acknowledgment packet.
More approaches to jamming-based methods can be found in [XWTZ04] and
[WSS03].
3.5. Device-based Methods
Most authors use these methods for the purpose of party/device authentication.
When a radio device receives a signal coming from a transmitter, there are several
factors that influence the received signal at the receiver. Radio Frequency (RF)
features can be classified into channel-specific ones, as already explained in Section
2.2, and transmitter-specific or device-dependent ones. We shall here say that we
employed device-dependent resources in order to extend the source of entropy of our
secret key establishment method, as we will see later in more detail in Chapter 5.
Due to its nature, wireless networks are specially vulnerable to many identity-
based attacks. E.g., an attacker might set his device to use forged MAC addresses
to impersonate a specific client or to create any false identity.
In order to cope with this problem, some authors pondered the possibility of using
device-dependent data, i.e. information that depends on the transmitter hardware,
for the purpose of transmitter authentication. This area is called device identity
management.
In Brik et al. [BBGO08], this property is referred to as radiometric identity or RF
fingerprinting: minor variations in the analog hardware of transmitters are mani-
fested as idiosyncratic artifacts in their emitted signals. Consequently, they can be
used to unequivocally identify a signal’s device-of-origin. It is a property of the
devices similar to biometric characteristics in humans. Both define identity as the
collection of observable properties depending on the individual’s constitution. The
authors developed an interesting technique to identify the source network interface
card (NIC) through passive radio-frequency analysis. The method they proposed
uses tiny imperfections of the transmitter hardware (acquired during the manufac-
turing) which are transmitter-specific and whose consequence is observable in the
emitted signals. In this case, RF identification is possible because of benign hard-
ware imperfections inherent to the analog component of a NIC’s transmitter. These
imperfections are also called impairments. The authors pointed out the following
impairments sources: quadrature errors, self-interference, frequency offset (which we
used later in Section 5.2) and amplitude clipping. Machine-learning tools are used
for classification. The authors developed a method they called PARADIS (Passive
RAdiometric Device Identification System). PARADIS defines a signal’s signature in
terms of structure related to the properties of the used modulation types. PARADIS
uses a classifier used to convert signatures to NIC MAC addresses. Like in all classi-
fication methods, there must be a training stage, where a wireless NIC signatures is
extracted and recorded in a data bank. An identification stage is then implemented,
where the features of the device-under-test is compared with the features saved in a
data bank. Experimentation results confirmed the feasibility of this technique.
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In [FC06], Faria and Cheriton proposed a new method for device identification.
Their method uses signal strength information (RSSI levels) reported by access
points as identification feature. Therefore, a signalprint is the signal strength char-
acterization of a packet transmission. As already explained thoroughly in Section
2.2, these are strongly correlated with the physical location of clients. Experimental
results confirming the theory are provided.
Device fingerprinting has been used in [BRC07] and [KBC05]. The main goal of
radio fingerprinting is the detection of signal features that form a valid fingerprint
valid for each single radio device. In [BRC07], Rasmussen and Capkun presented a
study showing the feasibility of radio fingerprinting for wireless sensor nodes using
a hardware device.Through fingerprinting, one can make associations between ob-
served messages and their senders. Therefore, replay attacks might be avoided by
using device identification. Five different features extracted out of the radio signal
transient were used for the creation of the device fingerprints.
In [KBC05], Kohno et al. introduced the new area of remote physical device finger-
printing, using a certain small, microscopic deviation in the device hardware, called
clock skews. It exploits the fact that modern computer chips all show this kind of
characteristic. The techniques do not require any modification to the fingerprinted
devices. The attackers exploited the device’s TCP timestamps option clock or TSopt
clock through wired connections.
Later, this idea has been extended for the identification of GSM Mobile Phones
in a recent paper by Hasse et al. [HGB13]. Their findings fall in the domain of
mobile forensics. They introduced time-based patterns of modulation error as a
unique device-dependent feature and carefully removed random effects of the wire-
less communication channel on GSM devices. They used two USRP N210 devices
operating in synchronized MIMO mode to collect the signals with a 900/1800 MHz
GSM antenna. Machine learning methods have, as usually in this field, been utilized.
Therefore, there is a training stage, during which the phones were placed close to
the receiver; it follows then a test stage, when the mobile phones were placed at a
different location. The main question is basically what makes a good feature. For
the purpose of device identification, it seems clear that the priority should lay in
extracting characteristics which remain stable over different dimensions and espe-
cially over time. It is of utmost importance to identify and remove all aspects that
introduce random behavior. The signatures were given to a linear Support Vector
Machine (SVM) for classification. The used features were based on the modula-
tion information (I/Q signals - see Section 6.3), namely the magnitude error (ME),
phase difference (PE), Error Vector (EV) and the length the Error Vector Magni-
tude (EVM). These were the common error metrics describing the precision of a
modulated signal. Given the high precision of GSM systems, they proposed to use
characteristic error pattern over the time of a normal burst as a device-dependent,
still non-environment dependable, feature. The RF hardware introduces stable de-
terministic deviations at specific times of a burst, being a consequence of, e.g.,
fluctuations of the power amplifier. According to the authors, the results were quite
encouraging.
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3.6. Other Interesting Wireless Security Schemes and
Applications
The methods presented in this section are designed to operate alongside other wire-
less security protocols, adding defense in depth. They are not meant to be methods
for generating a key or transmitting a secret message.
In [XJ10], the authors propose to use multi-antenna APs to determine the di-
rections from which an incoming signal arrives. They use this information - called
angle-of-arrival (AoA) - to construct signatures that identify each client in a multi-
path indoor environment. This allows the AP to drop packets coming from clients
physically located outside a building or office. In order to test their setup, the
authors make experiments using USRP2 devices and equipped them with several
antennas. They claim that while readily available from commodity hardware, RSS
is very coarse compared to physical-layer information, making it very prone to error
if few packets are available. They also claim that their method could be as accurate
as GPS for client location.
They extended their work in [XJ13]. They use their AoA information to construct
an AoA signature unique to each client and very hard to reconstruct. An attacker
would need to know the location of all obstacles in the vicinity of the AP and client
or to be located under five centimeters of the client’s antennas. This is again the
application of the multipath principle. The combined direct path and reflection path
AoAs form the unique signature for each client. They developed their method in
order to mitigate WiFi spoofing attack attempts. The literature about determining
AoA for multipath signals is extensive, mostly based on the MUSIC (Multiple Signal
Classification) algorithm, as explained in [VBBH05].
Multipath channel models can be even used for the spatial location of movement
using the signal strength on a wireless link, like explained in [WP11].
There is still the problem of identity in cryptography. In [CGMO09], the authors
launch the study of cryptographic protocols where the identity of a party is derived
from its geographic location. They lay a solid foundation for the problem of secure
positioning and even show how to realize secure multiparty computation using their
method. The question is now how to achieve secure positioning in the real-world
scenario using, e.g., wireless networks. This was done in [CH06]. The authors suggest
a mechanism for the secure position computation and verification of positions of
wireless devices, based on the measurements of the time of radio signal propagation.
However, no experimentation was provided in this work.
In some cases, estimating the WiFi signal strength of several AP can allow to build
a WiFi signal strength mapping inside a building that can give precious information
about the current location of an object measuring this intensity. This WiFi signature
map is used for a robot in the building to estimate its own location according to
the signal strength he is measuring at a certain position. They observed that the
bigger the number of visible access points, the small the localization error. For more
details, see Biswas et al’s paper [BV10]. It uses techniques from the above mentioned
secure positioning.
There is an extensive literature on the subject of wireless sensor networks routing
protocols. However, security issues in this field tend to be ignored or postponed. A
complete analysis of the security of these networks is presented in [KW03]. Attacks
and countermeasures have been listed. The same topic is also considered in [ABV06].
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Here, a formal security model based on the simulation paradigm has been proposed.
In [FC04], Faria et al. propose a technique providing location-based access control.
The main goal of the so-called authentication handshake is to limit wireless coverage
to the intended service area, imposing a maximum distance for authentication, which
is a function of the density and placement of access points. In other words, one seeks
that clients located outside a certain area should not be allowed to successfully
complete the handshake. Accordingly, an attacker located outside the intended
coverage area would need impractical amounts of antenna gain.
Similarly, in [CCH06], the authors propose three methods for authentication before
employing the Diffie-Hellman (DH) Protocol for key exchange over a radio link. One
of these methods is based on the interesting idea of using the distance between the
parties to authenticate them. It was called DH with distance bounding (DH-DB).
This protocol ensures that the DH protocol is performed only in case that there are
no other parties that are closer to A or to B than themselves.

4. Vulnerabilities and Attacks
In this chapter, we propose and analyze two types of attacks on fading-based key
exchange protocols: an attack on the protocol (Section 4.1), where we explore the
scarce entropy in the environment in order to reconstruct the signals that both
legitimate parties receive; and an attack on the implementation (Section 4.2), where
we focus on an inevitable property of all antennas: their reradiation leakage. The
results in this chapter are published in [DLMdA10].
4.1. Environment Reconstruction Attacks
In this section, we describe an attack where an adversary, Eve, can precisely re-
construct simple environments by using the signals she passively collects during the
execution of fading-based key exchange protocols between two parties. Knowing the
exact position of the reflecting objects, she can then calculate the signals Alice and
Bob receive.
In order to understand this attack, we shortly review the necessary concepts about
channel modeling, as described in detail in Section 2.2.2. Radio channels are usually
represented by their impulse response. As fading-based key exchange protocols take
place in a short period of time, we can realistically assume that the channels we
examine are static or quasi-static. Therefore, we have the time-invariant multipath
fading channel between a sender Alice and a receiver Bob given by the impulse
response
hAB(t) =
n∑
i=1
ρiδ(t− τi),
an impulse train, where the τi and ρi are the latencies and phasors of the direct and
scattered signal components, respectively. The scattered components are assumed
to arise by reflections of the sent signal. Reciprocity states that the channel charac-
teristics are the same during the coherence time of the channel if the roles of the
sender and the receiver are exchanged (cf. Section 2.2.4), thus
hBA(t) = hAB(t) =: h(t).
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Typical coherence times for fading channels take values around 2.5ms [TV05]. It
was observed in [HHY95] that the shared entropy that can be extracted from the
common channel impulse response h(t) might be used to generate a common secret
between Alice and Bob. Some practical implementations have already been designed
(see Section 3.2).
The elementary requirement for reciprocity-based key exchange to be secure is
the presence of a fading channel that quickly decorrelates in space due to multipath
interference. More precisely, the channel responses hAE(t) and hBE(t) an eavesdrop-
per measures should be uncorrelated to hAB(t) and hBA(t), respectively. Generally,
the spatial decorrelation is implicitly assumed in models describing fading channels
(cf. Section 3.2). The most common stochastic processes used to model the ran-
domness of fading channels are the Rayleigh and Rician processes. They have been
shown to be appropriate to model fading channels in urban or rural areas [OOKF68].
Such models are utilized to analyze and estimate typical error patterns in wireless
communication.
To the best of our knowledge, the issue of the amount of uncorrelated randomness
that can be extracted from multipath fading channels [MTM+08, YMR+09] has
so far failed to model how much uncorrelated randomness can be extracted from
multipath fading channels.
It seems infeasible to provide security guarantees for reciprocity-&-fading-based
key exchange. We illustrate this by providing a model that instantiates a fading
channel for which the reciprocity-based key exchange protocols become insecure un-
der reasonable assumptions. Even though this model is overly idealized, it demon-
strates the fundamental intricacies of wireless key exchange. Our model exhibits the
following properties:
• the environment is planar and there is only a finite and small number of point-
shaped specular reflectors (objects). They show isotropic reflection characte-
ristics, i.e., they reflect equally in all the directions. Each reflector Ri has its
distinct attenuation factor αi, which is the portion of the incident power that
is reflected. These values are chosen uniformly from (0, 1];
• there are two parties, Alice (A) and Bob (B), each sending and receiving one
signal, and a passive eavesdropper, Eve (E), who can merely listen to the
signals that Alice and Bob inject in the environment. Each of the parties has
one antenna;
• we consider only the first-order reflections of signals. Furthermore, in order to
simplify the analysis, we neglect the interference of other signals and noise.
We assume that Eve knows the geographical positions pA = (xA, yA) of Alice and
pB = (xB, yB) of Bob relative to her own position pE = (xE, yE). This might, for
instance, be the case if Alice is an access point and Bob is a static user terminal
[HIU+08]. However, she has no further information about the environment. Fig-
ure 4.1.1 is an example of such an elementary environment containing five objects,
represented by small circles, whose positions are unknown to Eve. If just one signal
s(t) is sent from Alice to Bob and vice versa, Alice and Bob will measure hBA(t)∗s(t)
and hAB(t)∗s(t), respectively, whereas Eve will measure hAE(t)∗s(t) and hBE(t)∗s(t)
(cf. Section 2.2.2). To simplify our analysis, we assume that s(t) is an impulse, i.e.
s(t) := δ(t), and that Eve can recover hAE(t) and hBE(t) such that the peaks can
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still be separated. In Figure 4.1, we consider the channel and the corresponding
power delay profiles measured by the Alice, Bob and Eve.
The information Eve learns from hAE(t) is, at the first glance, insufficient to
retrieve significant information about Bob’s measurement, i.e. hAB(t), since, from her
view, Bob’s measurement is undetermined by several degrees of freedom. So, Bob’s
measurement is subject to a significant amount of uncertainty seen as randomness
by Eve.
The bottom line, however, is that, in this model, given the channel impulse res-
ponses hAE(t) between Alice and Eve and hBE(t) between Bob and Eve, Eve is
enabled to uniquely recover the channel impulse response hAB(t) within the scope
of her measuring accuracy. We will briefly describe how this attack works.
Let
hAE(t) =
n∑
i=1
ρiδ(t− τi)
be the impulse response of the channel A-E, i.e., the signal Eve receives when Alice
sends an impulse s(t). Without loss of generality, we assume that the first peak,
ρ1δ(t− τ1) represents the direct path between Alice and Eve. All further multipath
components ρiδ(t− τi), i > 1, have traversed a distance
di = d(pA, pE) + (τi − τ1) · c,
where c is the vacuum speed of light. So,
di = d(pA, pRi) + d(pRi , pE) (4.1)
defines an equation for some reflector Ri that accounts for this multipath component.
The set of solutions for Equation (4.1) with respect to pRi defines an ellipse. Likewise,
every multipath component of hBE provides an ellipse equation. The possible loci of
the reflectors lie at the intersections of the ellipses obtained from hAE(t) and hBE(t)
and given by diA = c · τiAE = d(pA, pRi) + d(pRi , pE)diB = c · τiBE = d(pA, pRi) + d(pRi , pE). (4.2)
This system of equations has at most 4n2 solutions, where n is the number of re-
flectors in the environment. This is due to the fact that the maximum number of
intersections between two families of k and l confocal ellipses, i.e, ellipses having
common focal points, is 4kl.
Alice and Bob transmit the same sounding signal s(t). Bob measures hAB(t), Alice
hBA(t) and Eve the two channel responses hAE(t) and hBE(t). An example of the
power delay profiles of the channels is shown in Figure 4.1.2.
When a direct path is present, the primary peak represents this path in each
impulse response. Using the delay times between the primary peak and the re-
flected components, Eve can estimate the lengths of the signal paths of the reflected
components.
Until now, Eve has just used information from the power delay profile’s horizontal
axis (time). Nevertheless, she can also use the information provided by the vertical
axis (power) in order to reduce the degrees of freedom for the solutions. She knows
the transmitted power Pt and receives a power Pr, which is attenuated by:
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4.1.1: Randomly generated environment with reflectors. The circles indicate
the positions of the reflectors. The numbers next to the reflectors are their
attenuation factors.
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4.1.2: Power delay profiles at A (upper left), B (lower left) and E (right side,
upper from A and lower from B).
Figure 4.1.: Example of an environment and corresponding received signals by Alice
(A), Bob (B) and Eve (E).
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• free space propagation by a factor of α · d−2, where α is the free-space propa-
gation attenuation constant and d the traversed distance;
• reflection in object Ri by the reflector attenuation factor αi.
She can now check for each point of intersection if it is a valid position for a
reflector by testing whether it has approximately the same αi on both assumed
paths, i.e., solving (4.3) in relation to αi and searching for similar values.
Pr = Pt · α · d(pA, pRi)−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
propagation
· αi︸︷︷︸
reflection
·α · d(pRi , pE)−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
propagation
(4.3)
If this is the case, it means that the objects are in the positions denoted by a square
in Figure 4.2.1. In a final step, knowing each αi, Eve simulates the signal propagation
from Alice to Bob in her reconstructed environment to obtain an estimated h∗AB(t)
of hAB(t), as illustrated in Figure 4.3.
We have implemented this model in MATLAB R© and run simulations with several
parameter sets.
4.2. Side-Channel Attack: Reradiation Leakage
This attack targets side effects that appear in the implementation of the protocol in
real devices. A new attack against the wireless key exchange on the physical layer,
called reradiated wireless side-channel (RRW-SC) attack, is presented and analyzed.
First, we will review some concepts which are necessary for obtaining a method
for the derivation of upper bounds on the distance to a receiving antenna where it is
still practically possible for an adversary to recover a useful amount of information
by considering only the reradiation of the receiving antenna in use.
The general model for an antenna in the receiving mode is described in Sec-
tion 2.1.2.2. Accordingly, its Thévenin equivalent model consists of a simple electri-
cal circuit with the antenna impedance ZA = RA + jXA and the input impedance
of the receiver ZT = RT + jXT serially connected to the voltage generator VT rep-
resenting the induced voltage by the incident wave. In general, the resistive part
RA = Rr + RL of ZA consists of two components, where Rr represents the reradia-
tion resistance and RL the loss resistance of the antenna. In a conjugate matching
condition, i.e. Rr + RL = RT and XA = −XT, between the antenna and the re-
ceiver, the maximum amount of power is transmitted to the receiver. In this case,
expressions for powers PT, Pr, and PL delivered to RT, Rr, and RL, respectively,
as well as the collected (induced) power Pc can be simply calculated. From these
expressions follows that from the total amount of power Pc induced in the antenna,
one half is transmitted to the receiver (PT) and the other half is partly reradiated
(Pr) and partly dissipated as heat (PL). The reradiating factor, ρ, as defined in
Section 2.1.2.2, usually ranges between 0.4 and 0.8.
Thus, the power reradiated is an important phenomenon that can leak information
about the received signal. Let us consider the following example: Eve is equipped
with a receiver with a high-gain antenna (see Section 2.1) directed towards Bob’s
receiver in line-of-sight. The signal wave Bob receives from Alice (containing infor-
mation about the secret key) will be partially reradiated. Eve will try to capture
this signal in order to recover the key. Therefore, Bob and Alice should make Eve’s
intentions more difficult to achieve by implementing appropriate countermeasures.
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4.2.1: Environment estimated by Eve by performing the attack in
the environment depicted in Figure 4.1.1.
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4.2.2: Power delay profiles, hAE(t) and
hBE(t), measured by Eve. Using the in-
formation on both axis (time and power),
she can find the location of the objects in
the environment.
Figure 4.2.: Environment reconstruction attack performed by Eve. The red arrows
point to the signals which correspond to the direct paths. All other
arrows associate two peaks in the power delay profile with the respective
possible locations (an ellipse), indicated by the same color.
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Figure 4.3.: Power delay profile, h∗AB(t), between Alice an Bob as estimated by Eve.
For comparison, see Figure 4.1.2 (upper left).
In order to estimate the threat of the RRW-SC, we introduce the concepts of
attacking region, intermediate region and secure region. Figure 4.4 illustrates these
regions. The attacking region is defined as the area around Bob’s antenna where
Eve, equipped with receiver equipment, needs to be located such that she still has
a practical chance, given by an acceptable bit error rate, BER, or word (symbol)
error rate, WER, of recovering the secret key coming from Alice by using solely the
passive reradiation from Bob’s receiving antenna, i.e. the RRW-SC. It is bounded
by the maximal attacking range, Dattack. This distance corresponds to the distance
where a receiver would demodulate a M -ASK signal with a BER equal to a certain
threshold. We define the threshold of BER = 0.2 as a good practical limitation
for recovering the key. Note, however, that an attacker knowing that a bitstring
of length L = 128 has a number BER · L of bit errors, still has to try
(
L
dBER·Le
)
combinations. If L = 128 and BER = 20%, this corresponds to
(
128
26
)
≈ 290 keys.
The secure region is the region where Eve has no practical advantage of analyzing
the reradiation signals for finding the secret key. The minimal distance of (complete)
security, Dsecure, is the distance such that BER = 0.5, which gives Eve as much
possibility of getting the key by analyzing the reradiation signal as she would have
by randomly guessing the key. Therefore, this area is defined as the area where
dBE > Dsecure.
The intermediate region is defined as the region around Bob where it is still
realistically feasible for Eve to recover the key. Thus, this area is defined for all
values dBE such that Dattack < dBE < Dsecure.
For the estimation of Dattack and Dsecure, we employ an energy budget procedure.
This technique uses the variation of the energy propagated in the environment. The
first step is the expression of the average energy per bit at the receiver, denoted by
EbR, which is caused by free space propagation of electromagnetic waves. In terms
of the average energy per bit at the transmitter, denoted by EbT, this range equation
(cf. [Bla90]) has the following form:
EbR = aEbT =
GT
4pi
λ2GR
4pi
EbT
d2
= αAREbT
d2
. (4.4)
Here, GT and GR are the gains of the transmitting and receiving antennas in the
direction of propagation, d is the range from transmitter (Tx) to receiver (Rx) and
λ the wavelength of the electromagnetic radiation (EMR). The equation (4.4) can
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Figure 4.4.: Illustration of maximal attacking range (Dattack) and minimal distance
of security (Dsecure). Alice sends a signal which is reradiated by Bob.
Eve collects the reradiated signal. She can reconstruct with good quality
the signal that Bob receives if she is inside the circle of radius Dattack.
This quality degenerates with the distance. For a distance bigger than
Dsecure, it is virtually impossible for Eve to reconstruct that signal.
also be expressed in terms of average power, S, rather than of average energy, by
replacing EbR and EbT by SbR and SbT, respectively. The factor a in (4.4) represents
the energy (power) attenuation of EMR between Rx and Tx, which can be expressed
by the product of the effective area of the receiving antenna AR = λ
2GR
4pi and the
spherical density of the transmitting antenna gain α = GT4pi .
Any receiver at absolute temperature TR will always contaminate the received
signal with additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) of power spectral density N0 =
kTR, where k is the Boltzmann constant (k = 1.38× 10−23 [J/K]). This thermal
noise is due to unavoidable thermal fluctuations of electrons in the first stage of
amplification at electronic receivers. Actual receivers will have a somewhat larger
value of thermal noise power spectral density, N0, expressed as
N0 = FkTR, (4.5)
where F is a number known as the noise figure of the receiver. Ideally, F = 1, but
it happens to be larger in practice. For a high-quality receiver, it is comprised in
the range of 2 to 5.
Generally, the quality of digital communication can be expressed by the average
BER in the received data. In wireless communication systems, its value depends
on numerous influencing factors. The most important are: implemented modula-
tion/demodulation and error control encoding/decoding techniques, the information
bit rate Rb, the average power ST of Tx, the occupied frequency bandwidth W
around the carrier frequency fc, as well as EMR interferences, obstacles and reflec-
tors in the zone of influence around Tx and Rx. By considering only the ubiquitous
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influencing factors, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in the presence of additive white
gaussian noise (AWGN), given by SR
SAWGN
, can be expressed as
SNR = SR
WN0
= aST
WN0
, (4.6)
where SR = aST is the average signal power and SAWGN = WN0 the thermal noise
power at the input of Rx. By inserting (4.4) and (4.5) in (4.6), we have
SNR = αAR
FkTR
ST
Wd2
= Q ST
Wd2
, (4.7)
where Q = αAR
FkTR
represents the basic quality of the wireless AWGN channel. In
practice, there are many other influencing factors that degrade Q, like the conduction
and dielectric efficiency of antennas, taking in account losses at the input terminals
and within the structure of the antenna. Such degradation factors are very difficult
to model and compute, but they can be determined experimentally. Thus, the
practical basic quality Qp of a wireless channel has always a smaller value than Q
and can be expressed by the experimental corrective factor e < 1 as Qp = eQ.
For example, the basic quality of an omnidirectional wireless channel (GR = GT =
1) in the 433MHz ISM-band (Industrial, Scientific, and Medical radio bands) with
the carrier signal wavelength λ = 0.7m and a receiver at room temperature (20K)
and noise figure F = 2 amounts Q = 0.384× 1018 [m2/J]. The basic quality of
the wireless channel decreases with the growing carrier frequency. For example, in
the 2.4GHz ISM-band an omnidirectional wireless channel (GR = GT = 1) with
the carrier signal wavelength λ = 0.125m and a receiver at room temperature and
noise figure F = 2 has a basic quality of Q = 1.223× 1016 [m2/J]. When using a
transmitter with average power of ST = 100mW and a bandwidth W = 1MHz in
the 433MHz ISM-band, the dependence of SNR on the Tx – Rx distance d can be,
according to Equation (4.7), expressed as SNR = 3.84× 1010 d−2d−2. For a channel
in the 2.4GHz ISM-band and the same values of ST andW , this dependency is given
by SNR = 1.22× 109 d−2.
The most adequate detection technique for modeling the secret key extraction
in the wireless key exchange on the physical layer is the detection of an M -ary
amplitude shift keying signal (M -ASK, also called pulse amplitude modulation M -
PAM). The exact average word (symbol) error probability (WER) in dependence of
SNR for the M -ASK detection is given by [Pro02]
WER = (M − 1)
M
erfc
(√
3SNR
2(M2 − 1)
)
, (4.8)
where erfc(x) denotes the complementary error-function1 and M the number of
chosen amplitude levels in a signal sample labeled by Q = log2M key bits. For
example, from (4.7) and (4.8) and for the values of ST, W , λ, F , GR and GT chosen
above, the value WER = 1× 10−2 will be attained at the distance of d = 17 km in
the 433MHz ISM-band, whereas in the 2.4GHz GHz ISM-band the same value of
WER will be attained at the distance d = 1 km, if the number of detected amplitude
levels is M = 8. We can rewrite Equation (4.8) as
1erfc(x) = 2√
pi
∫∞
x
e−t
2dt
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SNR(WER) = 23(M
2 − 1)
(
erfc−1
[
M
M − 1WER
])2
. (4.9)
Under the above mentioned conditions, the SNR(dAB) at Bob’s receiver for the signal
coming from Alice is, according to Equation (4.7)
SNR(dAB) = QAB
STA
WABd2AB
, (4.10)
where QAB is the basic quality of the wireless channel between Alice and Bob, STA
the average power of Alice’s transmitter, and WAB the bandwidth used on this
channel. The SNR(dBE) at Eve’s receiving antenna for the signal reradiated from
Bob’s receiving antenna with a reradiating factor ρ = 1 (for a worst-case scenario
estimation) is, according to Equation (4.7),
SNR(dBE) = ρQBE
SRB
WBEd2BE
, (4.11)
where QBE is the basic quality of the wireless channel between Bob and Eve, SRB
the average power of Alice’s signal at Bob’s antenna, and WBE the bandwidth used
on the RRW-SC. Using (4.6) and some other expressions defined above, the term
SRB in (4.11) can be replaced by SNR(dAB)WABN0AB so that
SNR(dBE) = ρ
GTAGRBGrrBGRE
FEkTR
(
λ
4pi
)4
STA
WBEd2ABd
2
BE
, (4.12)
where GTA is the gain of Alice’s transmitting antenna, GRB the gain of Bob’s receiv-
ing antenna, GrrB the reradiating gain of Bob’s receiving antenna, GRE the gain of
Eve’s receiving antenna, FE the noise figure of Eve’s receiver, and TR the absolute
temperature of the first stage amplification circuit in Eve’s receiver. Finally, (4.12)
can be written as
SNR(dBE) = Qrr
STA
WBE
1
d2ABd
2
BE
, (4.13)
where Qrr, which is a function of the frequency, represents the basic quality of the
RRW-SC.
Alice and Bob’s interest will be to reduce Qrr, while Eve will try to improve
it. Eve can increase GRE of her antenna connecting it to a high quality receiver
(with small noise figure FE) whose first stage of amplification is cooled. The best
possible practical improvement of Qrr in this way can be attained by choosing the
following best quality parameters of a RRW-SC: highest reradiating factor of ρ =
1, receiving antenna gain of GRE = 1000 obtained using a high quality reflector
antenna connected to the perfect receiver with FE = 2 (a typical value for a very
good receiver), whose first stage of amplification is cooled in liquid helium up to
TR = 4K. Since Alice and Bob usually do not know each other’s position, they
will use omnidirectional antennas, which means that the following values of GTA =
GRB = GrrB = 1 can be assumed for best quality parameters. On the other hand, Eve
will be confronted with some unavoidable disturbances. The coincidental radiation
of Alice’s transmitter as well as other ubiquitous EMR interferences will more or
less decrease the basic quality Qrr of the RRW-SC. By replacing the best quality
parameters in Equation (4.12) and by omitting the influences of all degradation
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factors on Qrr, the best SNR value, SNR∗, on the RRW-SC, for given λ, STA, WBE,
dAB and dBE can be calculated. Replacing the SNR∗ in (4.8) directly gives the
word error probability with which Eve recovers the secret key under best achievable
conditions above assumed.
If, in (4.8), the WER is determined by some chosen value WER∗ and dBE is
taken as a free variable, the upper bounds Dattack or Dsecure on a RRW-SC can be
obtained. The value ofWER∗ determines the capacity of the digital communication
channel using ASK signaling (without using of any kind of error control codes).
WER defines the amount of symbols which are received incorrectly, i.e., which have
at least one bit error per block of log2(M) bits. If we assume a uniform distribution
of bit errors between the minimum and maximum amount of bit errors in a string of
length N log2 (M) for a given WER value, we can define the bit error rate, BER, as
the average between these values. For N blocks of log2 (M) symbols, the minimum
amount of errors would happen if just one bit is wrong per wrong symbol, i.e. a total
of N ·WER wrong bits. On the other hand, the maximum amount of errors would
happen if all bits in a symbol are wrong, i.e. a total of N · log2 (M) ·WER wrong
bits.
Taking the average of both, we get the following relation, which we use to relate
BER and WER:
BER = 1 + log2 (M)2 log2 (M)
WER. (4.14)
Inserting (4.14) in (4.9) , we have
SNR(BER) = 23(M
2 − 1)
(
erfc−1
[
M
M − 1 ·
2 log2 (M)
1 + log2 (M)
BER
])2
. (4.15)
Combining Equations (4.13) and (4.15), one has
Dattack := dBE
∣∣∣
BER=0.2
=
√√√√Qrr(f) STA
WBE
· 1
d2ABSNR(BER)|BER=0.2
(4.16)
and, by making BER = 0.5,
Dsecure := dBE
∣∣∣
BER=0.5
=
√√√√Qrr(f) STA
WBE
· 1
d2ABSNR(BER)|BER=0.5
(4.17)
In order to illustrate the magnitude of Dattack and Dsecure in practice, a few examples
are evaluated for different parameters. For all the cases, we take STA = 100mW,
WAB = WBE = 1MHz, and best quality parameters of the RRW-SC. Typical values
for Dattack and Dsecure are shown in Table 4.1.
Because of symmetry in (4.13), dAB and Dattack (or dAB and Dsecure) can be ex-
changed. For example, in the 433MHz ISM-band, if dAB amounts 700m, than
Dattack = 471m for M = 8. If, for the same conditions, we make dAB = 471m, than
Dattack = 700m.
In Figures 4.5 and 4.6, we depict the dependency of Dattack and Dsecure on several
parameters we can control, namely frequency and M . It is clear that Eve will have
an advantage if lower frequencies are used and smaller number quantization levels
are considered, since, for the same distance between Alice and Bob, dAB, she would
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f [MHz] dAB [m] M Dattack [m] Dsecure [m]
433 1000 4 1400 9260
433 1000 8 666 3507
433 1000 16 330 1697
433 700 8 471 2425
2400 1000 4 46 301
2400 1000 8 21 114
2400 100 4 456 3014
2400 100 8 217 1142
2400 100 16 107 553
Table 4.1.: Typical values of Dattack and Dsecure.
be able to reconstruct the key from larger distances, dBE < Dattack, from Bob’s
antennas. This is due to the fact that, as already mentioned, the quality of the
wireless channels declines with the frequency.
Figure 4.5.: Dattack dependency on dAB, f and M .
In Figure 4.7, we visualize the radius of each regions for a certain dAB, for both
433MHz and 2.4GHz bands.
The analysis of the figures and expressions above clearly shows that the passive
reradiation side-channel represents a serious threat for the wireless key exchange on
the physical layer. The reradiation side-channel can be always improved by using
many synchronized receivers placed at different positions around Bob’s receiver. This
kind of attack will not be considered here. The development of effective countermea-
sures against reradiation side-channel attacks remains an open problem. Possible
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Figure 4.6.: Dsecure dependency on dAB, f and M .
Figure 4.7.: Dattack and Dsecure for M = 4.
58 4. Vulnerabilities and Attacks
candidate countermeasures include the use of reradiation suppressing electrical and
opto-electrical antennas or even different jamming techniques.
4.2.1. Theory
4.2.2. Experimental Setup
In this section, our experimental efforts to measure the reradiation side-channel
are described. We tried to confirm in practice that Bob’s antenna leaks enough
information that can be captured and properly used by Eve. Due to the fact that
the energy of the reradiated signal is predictably very low, an experimental setup
that maximizes the reradiated power and minimizes all other signals’ interferences
is designed. This means that our setup must basically satisfy two conditions:
• minimize the power of the signals arriving to Eve originated in sources other
than Bob’s antenna, i.e. the signal coming from Alice in line-of-sight and all
signals coming from Alice through reflections or scattering;
• maximize the energy of Alice’s signal reradiated by Bob’s antenna, which
means that the pairs Alice and Bob, as well as Bob and Eve, should be in
line-of-sight positions.
In order to fulfill these requirements, we performed our experiments using an ane-
choic chamber as described in Section 4.2.3. This chamber is made of ferrite walls,
which have the property of absorbing the incident electromagnetic waves within a
certain frequency range, strongly reducing the reflection and scattering components
[FRA].
4.2.3. Hardware
In our experimental setup, Alice consisted of a USRP2 transmitter [USR] and a cor-
responding controlling laptop, as shown in Figure 4.8.1. Eve was equipped with a di-
rectional antenna [Ant] (Figure 4.8.2) pointed towards Bob’s antenna (Figure 4.8.3).
In order to collect the measurement traces, Eve’s antenna was connected to an os-
cilloscope with 2.5 GSamples/s of sampling rate.
Three experiments were performed:
1. Alice was placed inside the anechoic chamber in position A’ (Figure 4.9); noth-
ing was placed in position B (Figure 4.9); Eve just measured the received
signal;
2. Alice was placed outside the anechoic chamber in position A; nothing was
placed in position B and Eve’s antenna (point E) was pointed towards point
B. This way, points A and B are in line-of-sight position, as well as points B
and E; however, A and E have no line-of-sight between them;
3. a λ/4 dipole antenna (Figure 4.8.3) was placed at point B without any other
Bob’s receiver components (i.e. antenna in open circuit). Alice and Eve re-
mained as described in the previous item.
For all the experiments, we collect the signals measured by Eve when Alice emitted
a 430MHz sinusoidal signal of 100mW power. This frequency value is within the
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4.8.1: Alice’s USRP2 trans-
mitter with laptop (outside
the chamber).
4.8.2: Eve’s directional an-
tenna (inside the chamber).
4.8.3: Eve measuring Bob’s
omnidirectional antenna (on
the table inside the chamber)
reradiation.
Figure 4.8.: Alice, Bob and Eve’s experimental setup.
A
B
E
3 m
5.5 m
A'
Figure 4.9.: Schematics of the anechoic chamber with positions of Alice (A or A’),
Bob (B) and Eve (E).
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range where ferrite absorbent material is more effective. Each trace measurement
had a duration of 50 µs. Assuming that the ferrite walls absorbs the majority of
the energy, Eve would be able to detect Bob’s reradiated signal superimposed with
unavoidable residual reflection and diffraction components. For each experiment,
we gathered a set of traces. With those traces, the resulting average signal was
calculated. It is worth noting that all traces were aligned in both axis, due to the
uprising trigger set up (x-axis alignment) and due to the DC component extraction
(y-axis alignment).
4.2.4. Results
Firstly, we eliminated the DC component (or average value), xDC(t), of the signal
x(t) limited in to the interval T . This component can be expressed as
xDC(t) =
1
T
∫
T
x(t)dt. (4.18)
The AC component xAC(t) is given by xAC(t) = x(t) − xDC(t). The discrete case
is quite similar, with the respective changes. The DC-component, or average value,
xDC[n] of a signal x[n] limited to N samples is given by
xDC[n] =
1
N
N∑
i=1
x[i]. (4.19)
The AC-component xAC[n] is therefore given by xAC[n] = x[n]− xDC[n].
We discarded the DC component of the signals since we were only interested in
the supposed small variations due to the change in the environment. Afterwards,
we calculated the energy of the signal. The energy of a continuous signal x(t),
represented by E{xAC(t)}, during a certain period T is given by
E{xAC(t)} =
∫
T
x2AC(t)dt. (4.20)
Since the oscilloscope gives us the discrete measured trace of a signal, represented
here by x[n], we used the following expression for the computation of the energy:
E{xAC[n]} =
n∑
i=1
x2AC[i]. (4.21)
The value of the energy measured from those traces and given by the Equation (4.21)
is shown in Table 4.2 for all the experiments.
4.3. Discussion
The environment reconstruction attack demonstrates the principal unreliability of
implicitly assuming spatial uncorrelatedness of joint measurements: using the recon-
structed environment, Eve can now simulate the key exchange between Alice and
Bob and, thereby, recover the secret impulse response hAB(t).
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Exp. Alice Bob Energy
1 A’ None 3.9675
2 A None 2.436× 10−3
3 A Antenna 2.950× 10−3
Table 4.2.: Measured energy by Eve.
Concerning the reradiation leakage attack, according to Table 4.2, when comparing
the results for the experiments 1 and 2, it can be concluded that, as expected, the
anechoic chamber absorbs a great part of the signal energy coming from Alice. From
the experiments 2 and 3, it becomes clear that the insertion of an antenna at point
B (the extreme case of a reradiating receiving antenna in open circuit) is responsible
for a significant increase (about 17%) of the energy received by Eve. Thus, we
also experimentally demonstrated that reradiation is a side-channel that must be
taken into consideration in the development of key exchange protocols based on the
channels’ physical properties.
4.4. Conclusion
In certain applications, key exchange on the physical layer seems to be a promising
and viable alternative to key exchange protocols whose security is based solely on
computational assumptions. However, the conditions under which it can be securely
implemented are still to be rigorously defined. In this chapter, the security of such
schemes was examined in detail and two new attacks against this physical primi-
tive were presented. The first attack is strictly based on the potential simplicity
of the wireless channel. Under too simple environment conditions, an eavesdrop-
per can reconstruct the environment and, therefore, extract the common secret key
established between the two legitimate parties. The other attack is based on the
wireless systems physical properties and is considered to be a side-channel attack to
reciprocity-based schemes. We theoretically established under which conditions an
eavesdropper equipped with a receiver system has some chance to recover a common
key from the observation of the reradiated signal emitted from one of the protocol
parties. We concluded that, in order to avoid leakage by reradiation, higher frequen-
cies for channel sounding should be used, as this considerably reduces Eve’s power
to extract the key. We also presented the results of our efforts to experimentally
prove the feasibility of this attack.

5. Improvements to the Protocol
Insufficient entropy in the environment and unavoidable antenna reradiation leakage
convey important information about the received signals that can be used by an
attacker, as explained in Chapter 4. Both attacks may, however, be hardened by
introducing a new source of entropy in the system. In Section 3.6, we have seen
how one can use the intrinsic and irreproducible hardware properties of the devices
for authentication purposes. In this chapter, we present a new method consisting of
combining the small differences in the clocks of both legitimate parties’ devices with
the fading properties of the wireless channel for the purpose of generating a shared
secret key. This method tackles the challenge of increasing the difficulty involved
in reconstructing the secret key for an adversary. The problem of harvesting more
randomness, even when the fading-based key exchange protocol is performed in static
environments, is mentioned by several authors (e.g. [CPK10]). In this setting, we
explain a novel technique that enables us to achieve this goal. The main results of
this chapter are published in [MdA14].
5.1. Based on Radiation Pattern
In order to make it more difficult to perform the environment reconstruction and
reradiation leakage attacks, one can employ a special kind of antennas in at least
one of the legitimate parties. These antennas have radiation patterns which change
randomly with time. This technique builds upon the fact that the change of the
reradiation diagram cannot be predicted easily by any attacker. This method can be
implemented using the so-called ESPAR antennas. As a consequence, the generated
entropy lies not only in the channel, but also in random modification of the radiation
pattern. This method has been described in detail in Section 3.3.1 and does not
contain any original contribution by the author. As a drawback, we point out that
at least the party (or parties) having such an antenna needs an internal random
number generator and some memory for controlling the beamforming and saving
the settings for later reuse when receiving the signal.
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5.2. Based on Differences in the Local Oscillators
In this section, we will describe in detail how our novel technique combining channel
fading effects with hardware impairments in the transceiver’s devices can be imple-
mented.
We considered a special type of receivers, namely the direct-conversion receivers,
which we introduce later in detail. We point out that there might be other ways of
using the impairments in the receivers for the purpose of augmenting the entropy of
the generated key. We leave this subject for further research.
5.2.1. Channel
As described extensively in Chapter 2, it is usual to characterize the radio channels
through their impulse response. Recalling, the impulse response hAB(t) of the multi-
path fading channel between Alice and Bob in a time-invariant channel (during the
short time period of the protocol execution) can be represented by an impulse train
hAB(t) =
n∑
i=1
ρiδ(t− τi), (5.1)
where the τi are the propagation delays and the coefficients ρi the amplitudes of
different signal components arriving to Bob through n different paths. Because of
reciprocity, we can state that in theory
hBA(t) = hAB(t), (5.2)
which means that the channel characteristics are the same in both directions. Her-
shey et al. [HHY95] propose to use this common characteristic in order to generate
a secret key between Alice and Bob, as this signal corresponds to the signature of
the channel between these parties. Because of the spatial decorrelation of signals in
a fading channel, the channel responses, hAE(t) and hBE(t), that Eve receives are
uncorrelated to hAB(t) and hBA(t), respectively. This guarantees the secrecy of the
key.
Some practical implementations of this protocol have been described in detail in
[MTM+08], [LXMT06], [ASKMY07] and [CPK10]. However, the measured values
might be influenced by several imparities, like additive noise, differences in hardware
[CPK10], interference, manufacturing variations and the fact that the channel is not
sounded in both directions at the same time [PJC+13]. Some issues related to
synchronization are also addressed in [CPK10]. This can affect the channel state
information and induce asymmetries in the system. In real-world application, we
have therefore hBA(t) ≈ hAB(t). In order to cope with this issue, an information
reconciliation step should be performed at the end of the protocol to ensure that
both parties possess the same key (cf. Section 2.3).
Fading-based key exchange protocols only account for passive attackers. This
means that it is assumed that Eve is not able to jam the probing signals. Addition-
ally, Eve is supposed to be sufficiently separated (at least a few wavelengths) from
Bob.
Now let sA(t) = A cos(2pifAt) be the channel probing carrier signal sent by Alice.
According to Equation (5.1), Bob receives the signal rB(t) changed by the channel
given by
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rB(t) =
n∑
i=1
ρis(t− τi) (5.3)
=A
n∑
i=1
ρi cos(2pifA(t− τi)), (5.4)
which is the sum of n attenuated and delayed replicas of the original wave sA(t).
5.2.2. Hardware
One important type of common receivers are the so-called direct-conversion receivers.
This kind of receivers is often used by the software-defined radio community [USR,
gnu].
5.2.2.1. Direct-Conversion Receivers
Unlike superheterodyne receivers, a direct-conversion receiver (DCR) uses no inter-
mediary frequency for performing the demodulation stage. Instead, it uses a local
oscillator with a similar frequency to that of the carrier signal. A simplified diagram
of a DCR can be seen in Figure 5.1.
fB
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rB (t) rB (t) rB (t)
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Figure 5.1.: Direct-Conversion Receiver (simplified) at Bob.
The received signal rB(t) (cf. Equation 5.3) will be downconverted in the mixer
with local oscillator with frequency fB. The resulting signal is therefore
rMB (t) = A
n∑
i=1
ρi cos(2pifA(t− τi)) cos(2pifBt) (5.5)
Applying well-known trigonometric identities to Equation (5.5), we obtain
rMB (t) =
n∑
i=1
Ci[cos(2pi(fA − fB)t+ φi)+
+ cos(2pi(fA + fB)t+ φi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
filtered out
], (5.6)
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where Ci are amplitude coefficients depending on A, ρi and τi, and φi phases de-
pending on τi.
As we can see from Equations (5.5) and (5.6), due to the mixing of different
frequencies, new signal components with frequencies fA−fB and fA+fB are created
in this process. Therefore, a filtering stage is applied in order to clean the signal from
its undesirable higher frequency components. This removes the fA + fB component.
Applying a low-pass filter to rMB (t), we obtain the baseband signal
rBBB (t) =
n∑
i=1
Ci cos(2pi(fA − fB︸ ︷︷ ︸
δf
)t+ φi). (5.7)
This means that the DCR receiver outputs a signal whose amplitude is basically
defined by the channel characteristics and whose frequency, δf , is exclusively due to
the sender and receiver local oscillators’ frequencies. Combining these two factors,
we develop the protocol described next.
5.2.3. Basic Protocol
Taking into consideration what has been explained in the previous sections and
ideally assuming total precision of the local oscillators, we developed the following
basic protocol for common key generation:
1. Alice and Bob agree on a set of n frequencies, say F = {fk}nk=1. These
frequencies can be, without loss of generality, equally spaced, as illustrated
in Figure 5.2;
2. Alice and Bob randomly choose a frequency from F , i.e., fA R←− F and fB R←− F ;
3. Alice probes the channel with a frequency fA signal;
This means that Alice injects a probing signal sA(t) with frequency fA in
the environment. This wave propagates through the wireless medium. Bob
receives the incoming wave, rB(t), by tuning his local oscillator for the fre-
quency fB. After filtering, he finally obtains the baseband signal rBBB (t) given
by Equation (5.7);
4. Bob and Alice exchange roles. This means that Bob generates and sends a
probing signal, sB(t), with frequency fB, whereas Alice collects the channel
response to Bob’s signal, rA(t), with local oscillator tuned for fA;
5. Repeat the previous steps a certain number, N , of iterations and save the
respective channel responses in baseband, rBBi (t), i = 1, ..., N .
Because of the difference in the oscillators, a new signal with frequency δf =
|fB − fA| will be generated. As seen before, this signal combines information about
hardware oscillators in its frequency and about the environment in its amplitude.
Afterwards, this signal must be processed, as explained in the next section, in order
to obtain a binary sequence - the secret key.
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Figure 5.2.: Set of signal frequencies randomly sampled.
5.3. Key Extraction
In this section, a novel method for generating the key extracted from the surrounding
environment is described in detail.
Basically, all key extractors consist of two components (see Figure 5.3):
1. Features Extraction block (filter): selects and processes some selected features
of the incoming signal;
2. Quantizer: transforms the signal coming out of the filter into a binary sequence.
rB (t)
BB
Extraction
Features signal to quantize, q(i)
Quantizer
key, k
Figure 5.3.: Key Extractor Block Diagram.
In the next sections, we extensively describe how we implemented these two blocks.
5.3.1. Features Extraction
Most experimental studies on this subject use the time variation of the signals’ RSSI
(Received Signal Strength Indicator) values as input of the quantization block. The
values are then processed in a way such that the system imparities are minimized
and the entropy rate of the secret keys is maximized (cf. [MTM+08],[CPK10] and
[PJC+13]).
We consider the baseband signal demodulated by the transceiver in iteration i,
represented as rBBi (t). As previously explained, we do not restrict ourselves to the
amplitude values due to fading, but we also consider the effect of the frequency of
this signal due to differences in the local oscillators as a new source of common
entropy. Keeping this in mind, a simple Features Extraction Block is developed.
For each iteration i of the protocol, each party computes the output of this block
as:
q(i) := 1
N
N∑
k=1
|Xk|︸ ︷︷ ︸
fading
· 1
M
M∑
l=1
(Zl − Zl−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
local oscillators
, (5.8)
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where Xk are the local maxima and minima, and Zl the zero crossings, respectively,
of the signal rBBi (t), as depicted in Figure 5.4. This equation corresponds to the
product of the averages of the main characteristics: the amplitude (contained in
the values |Xk|) and the frequency (translated in the values Zl, being the interval
between two zero crossings approximately half of the period of the wave). The
averaging process tends to minimize the influence of the signals and measurements’
associated noise.
X1 X3 XN-1
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4
X2 X4 XN
time
... ZM-1 ZM
Figure 5.4.: Baseband signal with local extrema and zero crossings.
Basically, the effects of fading are being rescaled by the frequency of the signal
generated by the difference of the local oscillators’ frequencies. These values are
unknown to an adversary at the time the channel is sounded.
This technique is quite efficient since the number of performed calculations needed
for the key generation is small: for each sent frequency, one just needs to calculate
the peaks and the zero crossings of the signal. This is easy to implement in both
software and hardware.
5.3.2. Quantizer
Our quantizer performs a uniform discretization of the output of the Features Ex-
traction block.
Firstly, we plot the output of this block, q(i). We then proceed to make a quan-
tization of this signal according to a predefined number of quantization bits, Q, in
the following way:
1. The amplitude of the signal is divided in M = 2Q equally spaced intervals and
we assign to each of these intervals a binary sequence of Q bits;
2. For each iteration i, theQ-bit binary sequence, ki, corresponding to the interval
in which the value q(i) is located, is selected and appended to the extracted
key. Therefore, we obtain the secret key ke = k1||k2||...||ki||...||kN ;
Moreover, a gray code grid (i.e., such that adjacent quantization intervals just
differ in 1 bit) was used, in order to deal with slight imparities in the received
values, which minimizes the bit mismatches and consequently allows to obtain
better key agreement results (as in [PJC+13]).
Due to the fact that the quantization step was conducted taking into consideration
the minimum and maximum values of the signal, q(i) will be normalized in amplitude
by the Quantizer, which accounts for possible differences in the received gains or
properties of the hardware. This way, the influence of amplitude imparities in the
quality of the key, due to different gains at the receivers (cf. [CPK10]), is reduced.
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5.4. Simulation
Since in the real world it is virtually impossible to totally control the environment
and the hardware conditions, we firstly performed a simulation using MATLAB R©.
The main goal is to try to understand how big the advantages we gain by using the
hardware as a new source of entropy are and how much considering the difference
in the local oscillators frequencies can make it more difficult for an attacker to
reconstruct the signal obtained by Alice and Bob. In the simulation we can easily
separate the components influencing the received signal - the environment and the
hardware.
5.4.1. Channel
The environment was modeled as a simple discrete set of finite objects similarly to
Chapter 4. Under this model, the transmitted signal propagates along the physical
wireless environment and is reflected by each of these objects. Since the main goal
of the simulation is to seek to understand the effect of the oscillators, we considered
a very simple environment made of five different reflecting objects like in Section
4.1. We have been pessimistic, since real-world applications usually deal with more
complex channels, which clearly implies more entropy in the final key.
We considered a propagation path passing through each of these objects and con-
necting two transceivers (Alice-Bob, Alice-Eve and Bob-Eve). According to Equa-
tion (5.1), each path is characterized by an attenuation factor, ρi, (it encompasses
the influence of path attenuation, object absorption and reflection coefficients) and
delay τi introduced to the signal by the propagation distances traveled by the elec-
tromagnetic wave. We also consider a certain amount of unavoidable AWGN noise
in the channel, characterized by the signals’ SNR. All these factors will interfere in
the quality of the generated key. In our simulation, we introduced a dominant path
(as observed in [MTM+08]). This corresponds to the lowest value of attenuation for
this path and highest SNR. We also considered the channel not changing the fre-
quency of the signals. Channel reciprocity was ensured by giving very similar values
to Alice-Bob and Bob-Alice channels parameters. Nevertheless, the values were not
exactly equal, since there are always some imparities to be taken into account in the
real world: small changes of the channel due to synchronization issues, interferences
and measurement imparities.
On the other hand, fading was translated into our model by setting different values
for the Alice-Eve and Bob-Eve channels of those given to the Alice-Bob channel. In
all channels, a much stronger direct path component is considered, as observed in
[MTM+08].
5.4.2. Hardware
We ideally consider that Alice, Bob and Eve have identical transceivers. Each
transceiver was modeled as being a mixer and a simple low-pass filter with cut-
off frequency set to 500 kHz (cf. Section 5.2.2.1).
5.4.3. Protocol
We consider a small variation of the basic protocol described in Section 5.2.3. For
each iteration i, new sets FAi and FBi are created by Alice and Bob, respectively.
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Both sets are shifted a certain value ∆f to the right in each iteration (see Figure
5.5). This seeks to exploit in the real world the channel frequency characteristics
and is similar to the protocol we implemented in our prototype (see Chapter 6). In
the simulation, we considered both set of frequencies to have the same number of
elements. We established |FAi | = |FBi | = 20. This means that the difference in the
oscillation frequencies belong to a discrete set of values.
We also guarantee a minimal frequency distance between FAi and FBi , denoted
by ν, in order to ensure that there are at least two zero-crossings and one peak
(maximum or minimum) in the received signal.
frequency
... ... ... ... ... ......
fc fc
1
fc
2 N
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Figure 5.5.: FAi and FABi : set of frequency values Alice and Bob, respectively, tune
their local oscillator in iteration i, i = 1, ..., N .
In our case, we set ∆f = 1MHz and ν = 800Hz, starting at fc1 = 2.43GHz.
The range of the F sets was of 100 kHz. Typical values for the coherence band-
width, Wc, are usually around 500 kHz (cf. [WTS07] and [ZW99]), depending on
the environment. Therefore, for each iteration, δf < Wc and, thus, reciprocity still
holds.
For each iteration i, Eve randomly guesses a value from FAi and FBi and tunes
her local oscillator for those frequencies when receiving a wave from Bob and Alice,
respectively.
5.4.4. Experiments
In order to investigate the influence of the frequency oscillations in the quality of
the generated key and to separate the influence of the two factors (channel and
hardware) in the key quality, we design two experiments. Since we want to evaluate
the influence of the difference of frequencies in the generated key, we consider a very
simple wireless channel, consisting of only five reflectors, which are responsible for
attenuating and phase shifting the original signal. As mentioned before, in order
to simulate the reciprocity property, the attenuation parameters for the channels
A-B and B-A are, of course, very similar. They are not totally equal in order to
simulate some differences due to other kind of asymmetries (e.g., due synchronization
issues), as already mentioned. Those parameters are different from the ones for the
eavesdropper’s channels due to multipath interference.
5.4.4.1. Experiment I
In this case, we are interested in checking how very simple channels influence the
shared key. This is the case when Eve knows the oscillation frequencies, but has no
knowledge about the channel Alice-Bob at all. This would happen in the ideal case
when Eve has a perfect clone of Alice and Bob’s hardware.
Here, the source of entropy is restricted to the channel. Therefore, hBE 6= hBA
and hAE 6= hAB, whereas fBE = fB and fAE = fA (see Figure 5.6).
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Figure 5.6.: Exp. I: Eve knows the oscillation frequencies (but not the channels).
5.4.4.2. Experiment II
This experiment corresponds to the real-world scenario (though in a very rudimen-
tary environment), i.e., when Eve knows nothing about the environment or about
the hardware.
Therefore, under this scenario, there are simultaneously two sources of randomness
- the channel and the hardware oscillators.
Thus, hBE 6= hBA and hAE 6= hAB and fBE 6= fB and fAE 6= fA (see Figure 5.7).
5.4.5. Key Agreement Rate
As a figure of merit for the quality of our method, we define the key agreement
rate, KAR, as being the relative amount of equal bits on both generated keys, i.e.,
the ratio of the Hamming-Distance, HD, between the generated keys, kP1 and kP2 ,
on parties P1 and P2, respectively, and the length of the keys, L = |kP1| = |kP2|.
Mathematically,
KAR(P1, P2) =
HD(kP1 , kP2)
L
(5.9)
Ideally, we expect KAR values around 100% between Alice and Bob; and around
50% for the Alice-Eve and Bob-Eve channels. This would be for Eve as good as by
simply performing a random guess of the key, which means that she would gain no
advantage from the received signal.
5.4.6. Results
The obtained values for KAR for both experiments are shown in Table 5.1. The
shown values are an average over five runs of the Experiments.
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Figure 5.7.: Exp. II: Eve knows nothing.
Exp. A-B E-A E-B
I 99.6 99.5 97.3
II 99.8 72.4 72.9
Table 5.1.: KAR (%) values for all experiments.
Another way of illustrating the quality of the key extraction method is to check
simultaneously the profiles of the quantizer’s output of all the parties. Figures 5.8
and 5.9 show these profiles for the experiments I and II respectively. For each
experiment, the upper two graphs in each figure correspond to the output of Alice
(left) and Bob’s (right) quantizers, i.e., the left graph shows the key extraction
output from the signal received by Alice coming from Bob and the right one from
the signal received by Bob coming from Alice. The downer plots present the signal
received by Eve from Bob (left) and Alice (right).
5.5. Discussion
On the one hand, both upper graphs of Figures 5.8 and 5.9 are similar, which is a
straightforward consequence of the reciprocity of the wireless channels. On the other
hand, it is clear that the signal transmitted by Bob received by Alice (upper left
corner) and by Eve (lower left corner) and the signals received by Bob sent by Alice
(upper right corner) and by Eve (lower right corner) are different, which is due to
the multipath properties of these channels and/or different oscillation frequencies.
Therefore, it seems accurate to say that the performed simulations confirm our
theoretical underpinnings. The profile is however very flat, which can be explained
by the fact that we considered a channel with very simple characteristics, i.e., low
entropy.
Table 5.1 and the quantizers’ outputs show that the differences in the oscillation
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Figure 5.8.: Exp. I: Eve knows the oscillation frequencies (but not the channels).
Figure 5.9.: Exp. II: Eve knows nothing.
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frequencies play an important role in protecting the system from an eavesdropper.
For our purposes, we consider an idealized simple environment, where the reflections
influence is small in the received signal.
However, while the KAR values for the Alice-Bob channel are similar for both
experiments, significant differences in the values for the eavesdropper channels re-
flect the fact that the oscillation frequencies differences contribute decisively for the
security of this method.
These results suggest that the usage of hardware-based “asymmetries” act like
amplifying the multipath property of the channel, in the same way as the usage of
ESPAR antennas do by changing the radiation pattern during the execution of the
channel sounding ([AHT+05b] and [SHOK04]).
5.6. Conclusion
We extend the source of randomness in order to include also the unavoidable impar-
ities in the transmitter and receiver hardware by leveraging the differences in the
oscillation frequencies of the local oscillators, which may vary with temperature or
manufacturing process. This technique enables us to increase the security of the
wireless key exchange method. We demonstrate how the spurious signals created by
mixing signals with different frequencies can be used in order to augment the security
of the key exchange system based on wireless fading, even when the environment is
static.
A simulation showing that small differences in the oscillation frequencies can in-
duce different quantizers’ profiles and, therefore, cause disparities in the resulting
keys, was developed. We acknowledge, though, that the simulation is only a sim-
plification of the real-world conditions. It only takes into account a finite degree
of randomness in the frequency values. However, in practice, these values can be
continuous (as we will see in the next chapter) and therefore hardly predictable by
an attacker.
The experiments suggest that the oscillation differences due to imparities in the
local oscillators act in the same way as the ESPAR antennas. In this case, the adver-
sary is not able to easily find the time-varying beamforming characteristic of these
antennas. Similarly, in our novel method for key generation, the adversary is unable
to predict the oscillation frequencies resulting from the unavoidable impairments in
the legitimate parties’ local oscillators. By taking this into account, we introduce
another source of entropy when generating the key, which allows us to harvest more
randomness in total.
The eventuality of a very simple environment, providing too low entropy, or even
the existence of side-channel attacks on fading-based key exchange protocols, has
been mostly neglected. One advantage of extending the source of randomness to the
hardware components lies in the fact that these attacks against these protocols will
be hardened. The environment may have almost no entropy or Eve might be able of
measuring the reradiation from the antennas; however, as long as she doesn’t know
which frequency to tune precisely her receiver to, she will no longer have enough
information to correctly reconstruct the baseband signal.
Our method is easy to implement, both in software as in hardware and can, thus,
be deployed in off-the-shelf equipment.
6. Experimental Validation
In this chapter, we describe our efforts to experimentally validate the key gener-
ation method we proposed in the previous chapter. This method combines the
environment and the hardware properties for the generation and sharing of a secret
bitstring between two parties. We design and conduct two main experiments. In
the first experiment, we show that the originated frequencies are only a result of the
devices and not due to other overseen phenomena. In order to isolate the possible
causes for the difference in the frequencies of the originated signals, we perform a
series of smaller experiments under controlled conditions. Moreover, we evaluate
the validity of our method under real-world indoor and outdoor conditions. For this
purpose, we develop a prototype with which we perform a second main experiment.
We conducted different data collection campaigns in different outdoor environments
with different characteristics: a static (rural) environment, a semi-dynamic (semi-
urban) environment and a dynamic (urban) environment. We introduce a set of
parameters used as a metric for the quality of the results. The practical aspects of
the experiments were carried out in collaboration with Simon Dreher. Finally, we
analyze the obtained results and draw conclusions. This was done during the prepa-
ration of Michael Markus Studienarbeit. Further, we identify quality criteria for key
extraction techniques and we seek, according to those, the best way, for different
types of environments, of combining the information from the environment with the
information due to the hardware.
6.1. Hardware and Software
We use one USRP1 device per party (Alice, Bob and Eve) as a transceiver front end
for generating the channels’ probing signals and for measuring the corresponding
echoes (cf. Section 3.2). Each USRP1 device is equipped with a direct conver-
sion RFX2400 daughterboard. They provide superior performance in the 2.4GHz
-2.483GHz band and have 50mW of output power. Two of these devices are con-
nected to an omnidirectional antenna, whereas the third one is linked to a logpad-
antenna (detailed description about all hardware components, including data sheets,
can be found in [USR]). Since all parties receive and send the probing signals th-
rough the same antennas, the fact of using different types of antennas will not affect
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the global reciprocity of the system (cf. Section 2.2.4).
Our implementation uses the GNU Radio software platform [gnu] installed in
similar laptops running Linux-OpenSUSE distributions for the interaction with the
transceivers. Synchronization was performed by sending and receiving packets th-
rough the 802.11 Ethernet cards installed in the laptops. Our software is written
in Python programming language and also includes the implementation of the syn-
chronization and sounding parts of the protocol, as well as the CASCADE protocol
(cf. Section 2.3) for information reconciliation. It is flexible and easily allows the
implementation of different methods for the key extraction. Bash scripts were also
used in order to automatize the experiments, namely the exchange of parties in each
device, as shown later in the Table 6.1.
The thorough analysis of the experimental results and the generation of the key
were processed oﬄine in MATLAB R©.
6.2. Experiment: Differences in the Frequencies
In this section, we describe our experiments laid out to confirm that the different
frequencies we observe are solely due to inherent properties of the hardware devices.
For that purpose, we had to isolate the potential causes of this behavior. A few
possible causes were identified: equipment (i.e., the combination of laptops (L1, L2,
L3) and transceiver hardware (H1, H2, H3)), positions (X,Y ,Z), party (A, B or E)
and location (laboratory or between walls).
6.2.1. Location
We perform our experiments in two different locations at our Institute: in our labo-
ratory (Section 6.2.1.1) and between two different rooms (Section 6.2.1.2).
6.2.1.1. Laboratory
As depicted in Figure 6.1, all parties are placed on an octagon shaped table located
at our laboratory. The positions X, Y and Z are defined to be approximately one
meter apart from each other. The equipment is placed on these positions. It consists
of three pairs of laptops together with the transceiver hardware devices, denoted by
L1/H1, L2/H2 and L3/H3.
We performed three experiments. For each of them, we tried all possible combi-
nations of parties for each pair laptop/hardware (see Table 6.1):
1. inter-exchange the hardware positions, i.e., place L1/H1 at position Z, L2/H2
at position Y and L3/H3 at position X;
2. increase the distance between X and Z;
3. rotate the positions X, Y and Z 45◦ clockwise .
6.2.1.2. Between Rooms
In order to collect more evidence for our results and to prove that such a difference in
the frequency is not due to the location, we repeated the same experiments between
two different rooms, as depicted in Figure 6.2. The distance between points X, Y ,
Z was, necessarily, increased. Point X was also tested for two different positions: in
positions X and X ′ (behind a concrete pillar).
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Figure 6.1.: Laboratory: laptops and transceivers were placed on a table in positions
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Figure 6.2.: Between rooms: Floor plan of both rooms.
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6.2.2. Results
In this section, we present and analyze the received baseband signals (as described
in Section 5.2.2).
6.2.2.1. Laboratory
Figure 6.3 shows a typical sample of the baseband signals (cf. Section 5.2.2) received
by H1 coming from H3, by H3 coming from H1, by H2 coming from H3 and by H2
coming from H1. Without loss of generality, this figure corresponds to the situation
where Alice is placed at position X equipped with hardware H1, Bob at position Y
using hardware H3 and Eve at position Z equipped with hardware H2. However, we
tried all possible configurations.
Figure 6.3.: Received baseband signals: we observe that the signals H3 → H1 and
H1 → H3 have the same frequency, which is different from the frequen-
cies of the signals H3 → H2 and H1 → H2.
By visual inspection, one can easily confirm in Figure 6.3 that one wave clearly
shows a smaller frequency (H1 → H2). We extensively test for the influence of the
location, hardware and role assumed by each party on these results.
We permanently observe that the signal showing a remarkable difference in the
frequency always appears between hardware H1 and hardware H2, irrespective of
the role, position in the room or location.
We conclude therefore that a significant difference between the oscillation fre-
quencies of the local oscillators of both hardware devices H1 and H2 is the cause
of such frequency. The differences in the frequencies between the pairs of hardware
H1 and H3 and H2 and H3 are lower, as one can see in Figure 6.3. E.g., in this
case, the signal between H2 and H1 had a frequency of approximately 4 kHz, the
signal between H3 and H1 and H1 and H3 the frequencies of 16 kHz (sometimes
there are small variations between these two values) and H3 and H2 of 12 kHz, as
we show schematically in Figure 6.4. All these values are significantly smaller than
a coherence bandwidth Wc = 500 kHz (cf. [WTS07]).
6.2.2.2. Between Rooms
No significant differences in frequency were observed between the layout containing
the position X and the one containing X ′. However, it was observed that the
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Figure 6.4.: Approximate frequencies of the generated signals (fH2 − fH1 , fH3 − fH1
and fH3 − fH2) resulting from differences in the frequencies in the local
oscillators of the devices H1, H2 and H3.
magnitude of the received signal was weaker when position X ′ was examined. This
is clearly due to the massive concrete pillar in front of one of the transceivers, which
is responsible for a stronger attenuation of the incoming and outgoing waves. Once
again, the wave showing a larger period was the one corresponding to the pair H1
and H2, irrespective of the roles (Alice, Bob or Eve). This supports our theoretical
considerations stating that the originated signals are due to some imparities in the
devices’ local oscillators.
6.2.3. Discussion
By isolating the different possible causes of the generated signals, we confirmed
that the hardware is the only possible cause for the origin of signals with different
frequencies. We use this fact in our novel key exchange technique as proposed in
Chapter 5. We experimentally consolidate this idea in the next section.
6.3. Experiment: Key Exchange Evaluation
In order to check the feasibility of using frequency information for generating a
shared secret key under different real environments, we perform an experimental
data collection campaign for testing our key exchange protocol. We implement
several extractors (as defined later in Section 6.3.2.3) and we present the obtained
results in several graphs.
6.3.1. Protocol
We use a slightly different protocol than the one presented in Sections 5.2.3 and
5.4.3. Instead of creating new sets FAi and FBi for each iteration i, we assume that
the transceivers’ local oscillators inherently contain unavoidable frequency errors,
as shown in Section 5.2.2.1, i.e., small unpredictable variations of the oscillation
frequency, , due to manufacturing issues, temperature or other differences, as men-
tioned, e.g., in [BBGO08]. It is virtually impossible to tune exactly to a certain
oscillation frequency. As an example, the signal of approximately 15 kHz originated
between H2 and H3 in an oscillation frequency of 2.4GHz accounts for an error
of 6.2× 10−4 %. Actually, when we intend to tune the local oscillator to a certain
frequency fci , the device gets tuned for fci ± . The difference in the actual tuned
frequencies by the devices A and B will be responsible for the creation of a new
signal baseband component, as explained in detail in Section 5.2.2.1. Therefore, this
difference, δf = |fA−fB| = |A−A|, naturally takes values in a continuous interval.
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As illustrated in Figure 6.5, the implemented protocol runs the following way:
1. Alice starts sending an analog sounding signal, e.g., a carrier wave with a
certain frequency fc1(±A);
2. using a TCP packet transmission, sync signal, Alice signalizes Bob that she
already started sending a signal with frequency fc1 ;
3. Bob saves the incoming signal during a certain period of time, ∆t, tuning his
local oscillator for the same frequency value fc1(±B);
4. Bob informs Alice that she can already stop sending the analog probing signal
and Alice interrupts the transmission of the wave;
5. Alice and Bob exchange their roles and perform the previous steps accordingly;
6. Repeat this procedure for all other central frequency values fci , i = 1, ..., N ,
where N is the total number of central frequencies previously agreed between
both parties.
Alice Bob
send.start()
send.stop()
send.start()
send.stop()
sounding signal
sync signal
fci
fci
 t
 t
Figure 6.5.: Protocol for channel sounding in iteration i.
Several runs (between 5 and 30) for each central frequency, fci , were performed
while collecting the data. 4096 points were saved for each central frequency fci .
Each run takes around 19 seconds to be executed using USRP devices. In order
to avoid any interferences between the sounding signal sent by the USRP1 and the
synchronization (sync) signal around 2.4GHz being sent by the laptop’s Ethernet
cards (Figure 6.5), the starting sounding carrier frequency was chosen to be slightly
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higher than 2.4GHz, namely fc1 = 2.43GHz. The sounding frequencies were sepa-
rated by ∆f = 1MHz (as in Section 5.4.3), until reaching the value of 2.473GHz,
which corresponds to N = 44 probing bands. These values lie within the 2.4GHz
ISM band and within the range allowed by the RFX2400 daughterboards.
The signal traces were saved in the laptop and later transferred to a PC, where
the analysis and processing steps of the different key extractors (described later in
Section 6.3.2.3) were performed oﬄine using MATLAB R©.
Each USRP receiver measures an in-phase (or real) component (I) and a quadra-
ture (Q) component for each received signal RBB(t), say RBB(t) = RBBI (t)+RBBQ (t).
As input of our signal transformation block (Figure 5.3), we considered only the
in-phase component of the signal, i.e., rBB(t) = RBBI (t) = Re(RBB(t)), since the
quadrature component brings no further information about the channel or local
oscillator frequencies.
The main purpose of the experiments is to test for the suitability of our technique
in different kinds of real-world channels. A role configuration corresponds to the
allocation of a role (Alice, Bob or Eve) to a certain spatial position. In all performed
experiments, all six possible role configurations were tested, as presented in Table
6.1.
Config./Position X Y Z
I Alice Bob Eve
II Bob Alice Eve
III Alice Eve Bob
IV Bob Eve Alice
V Eve Alice Bob
VI Eve Bob Alice
Table 6.1.: Set of all possible role configurations.
6.3.2. Experimental Variables
When generating a new secret key, it is of utmost importance that this key looks
as as-random-as-possible, similar on both legitimate parties and different to the key
estimated by an eavesdropper. We conduct several experiments in order to evaluate
the feasibility of our method under different conditions or experimental variables:
environment, key extractors, quantization levels and key agreement rate.
6.3.2.1. Environments
We tested our protocol under different kind of environments concerning their dy-
namic, namely rural (R), semi-urban (SU) and urban (U) environments.
Indoor In this section, our experimental efforts to measure the feasibility of our
technique in a typical indoor environment are described. We conducted the indoor
experiments in October 2013.
The experiments were performed during an inactivity time period at our Institute.
This guarantees that the environment is static and minimizes the interference of
other signals.
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In order to test the feasibility of our method, we test at different distances, namely
along the corridor at our Institute. For this group of experiments, two transceiver
platforms (a set of USRP, laptop and antenna) are placed constantly at positions
X and Y , whereas the movable platform is subsequently placed at eleven different
positions, represented as Z = a, b, c, ..., k (see Figures 6.6 and 6.7). Each position
Z defines a certain layout. We performed a number of runs Nr = 5 for all role
configurations for each layout.
2,5 5,0 m0
Figure 6.6.: Corridor:
All Layouts
(Z = a,...,k).
Figure 6.7.: Inside the Corridor.
Figure 6.8.: Indoor Environment (hallway in the Institute).
We have implemented a script that sets the configurations automatically (i.e.
automatically changes the roles of each transceiver platform after a certain number
of runs of the same experiment) for each layout. The platform is manually moved
to the next position after the script finishes executing. Then, the script is restarted.
This procedure is repeated for each one of the layouts Z = a, ..., k.
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Outdoor All the outdoor experiments were conducted in spots located around the
KIT-Campus Süd area, as depicted in Figure 6.9, during the summer of 2014.
Figure 6.9.: Outdoor Environment (KIT-Campus Süd): Places where the experi-
ments were conducted. R: Rural; SU: Semi-Urban; U: Urban.
Rural The experiments for this kind of environment were performed in a forest
environment. This environment is quite static, however still shows complex charac-
teristics. It is typically characterized by the presence of static and dense obstacles,
namely trees and other kinds of vegetation, as shown in Figure 6.10. Vegetation is
known to have a big impact on the results of outdoor tests [AP09].
The antennas were placed in a triangular pattern approximately 15 meters apart
from each other.
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Figure 6.10.: Outdoor Environment (Rural). X, Y and Z mark the positions where
the antennas were placed.
Semi-Urban We conducted the experiments in the courtyard in front of the In-
formatics Department building. This location is a typical example of a semi-urban
environment, where one can find different kind of static obstacles (like buildings)
and some smaller moving objects (like bicycles or even people). In order to con-
sider a variety of possible different situations, four different cases were considered,
as schematically presented in Figure 6.11:
a. Line-of-sight (LOS) between all parties, Xa, Y and Z (Exp. SU a);
b. LOS between all parties, Position Xb close to a wall (SU b);
c. one party at position Xc has LOS contact to another party (SU c);
d. one party at position Xd has no LOS contact with any other party (SU d).
Figure 6.11 shows the three parties placed in a triangle configuration, also approx-
imately 15 meters apart from each other. The antenna placed in position X had its
position changed a few times to obtain the configurations (Xa, Xb, Xc and Xd).
Urban We chose the road junction in the area around the Informatics Department
building as representative of a dynamic environment. This environment is charac-
terized by intensive movement of objects. Particularly, it consists of a road with four
lanes and intensive traffic. There is also a bridge used by pedestrians and bikes, as
seen in Figure 6.12. Two different scenarios were considered:
1. All parties located at the same height in the road;
2. Party Z placed at a different height, namely on the bridge at a higher level
(position Zb).
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6.11.1: Picture of the Courtyard.
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6.11.2: Scheme of the positions where the antennas were placed.
Figure 6.11.: Outdoor Environment (Semi-Urban): Courtyard located next to the
Informatics Department Building. Antennas were placed in positions
X, Y and Z.
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6.12.1: Picture of the road junction.
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6.12.2: Scheme of the positions where the antennas
were placed.
Figure 6.12.: Outdoor Environment (Urban): Road junction located immediately
next to the Informatics Department building.
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6.3.2.2. Quantization Bits
An important parameter that needs to be considered when developing the extractor
is the number of quantization bits, Q, used to perform the quantization step (cf.
Section 5.3.2). Therefore, we study the influence of this parameter on the key
agreement rate, KAR, and on the randomness of the key. Recalling, using the
notation of Section 4.2, the number of quantization levels, M , is given by M = 2Q.
6.3.2.3. Key Extractors
In Section 5.3, we define key extractors as a means of extracting different features
of a signal and combining them. One of the main challenges of fading-based key
exchange is to find out what features to extract and how to combine them. Thus, we
can also designate the key extractors by key combiners. In Chapter 5, we explained
in detail how to combine the frequencies with the amplitudes. Nevertheless, we
only introduced one simple extractor, namely the product of averages key extractor,
where the average of the magnitude of the amplitudes is multiplied by the average of
the interval between zero-crossings (which depends on the frequency of the signal).
Next, we present other combiners. For the sake of simplicity of notation, let us define
X as the average of the amplitudes magnitude of the received signal, as shown in
Figure 5.4, i.e.,
X := 1
N
N∑
k=1
|Xk|,
where N is the total number of extreme points, and let Z be the average of the size
of the interval between two zero crossings, i.e.,
Z := 1
M
M∑
k=1
(Zl − Zl−1),
where M is the total number of zeros. The averaging process is introduced in order
to reduce the influence of the noise from the measurements of these two quantities
- amplitude and zeros. Note that the zero-crossings are directly related to the
frequency, f , of the signal by f = 1/(2Z).
Keeping this notation in mind, we define the following combiners:
Amplitudes (X) This extractor mainly considers the effects of fading in the signals,
which is reflected in the amplitude of the signals. It is the basic extractor and ignores
any signal’s frequency information.
q(i) := X (6.1)
Zeros (Z) This extractor only takes the effects of the hardware into consideration.
It does not contemplate any information about the fading. It only serves as a
reference for comparison to the results of the other extractors.
q(i) := Z (6.2)
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Product of Amplitudes and Zeros (XZ) This extractor is the basic combiner of
amplitudes and zeros that we consider. It combines the effects of fading and local
oscillators (hardware) together by multiplying the (average of) amplitudes with the
(average of) zeros. This combiner was already introduced in Section 5.3.1, under
the designation of Product of Averages.
q(i) := XZ (6.3)
Square of Both ((XZ)2) In this extractor both effects of fading and local oscillators
by squaring the product of the averages with the amplitudes are combined. By
introducing this extractor, we study how the square operation affects the results.
q(i) := (XZ)2 (6.4)
Division of Amplitudes by Zeros (X/Z) This extractor is similar to the XZ-
Extractor. The only difference resides in the mathematical operation connecting
these effects, namely a division.
q(i) := X/Z (6.5)
Trimmed Means (trm) This extractor is similar to the XZ-Extractor (cf. Sec-
tion 6.3.2.3). The difference resides in the fact that the 10% outlier values are
excluded (also called truncated mean), i.e., the 5% lower and the 5% values do
not count for the calculation of the average. By using this extractor, we search for
excluding any atypical values that may occur due to unforeseen reasons: wireless
interference, bad measurement and noise. Mathematically, this combiner is defined
the following way:
q(i) := X ′Z ′, (6.6)
where X ′ and Z ′ stand for the trimmed (or truncated) average of the amplitudes,
i.e.,
X ′ := 1
N ′
N ′∑
k=1
|Xk|,
and
Z ′ := 1
M ′
M ′∑
k=1
(Zl − Zl−1),
where N ′ and M ′ stand for the number of amplitude (|Xk|) and zero (|Zl − Zl−1|)
elements excluding the 5% lower and the 5% higher values.
6.3.3. Quality Criteria
After the execution of the fading-based key exchange protocol, we hope that Alice
and Bob share as many similar bits as possible before the information reconciliation
step takes place, whereas Eve is able to guess only around 50% of the secret bits.
This idea is captured by the concept of key agreement rate, which is defined in
Section 5.4.5.
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At the same time, it is very important that the key exhibits random characteristics,
e.g. by avoiding long strings of 1s and 0s. As in [PJC+13, YMR+09], we employ an
often used test suite for the evaluation of the randomness of the generated bitstring,
namely the NIST test suite, as described in Section 6.3.3.3.
6.3.3.1. Key Agreement Rate (KAR)
The key agreement rate was already defined in Section 5.4.5. This parameter is used
also in [PJC+13]. The authors use the terminology bit mismatch rate (BMR), which
is BMR = 1−KAR.
Ideally, due to the reciprocity property of the wireless channels, we predict to
achieve values around 100% for KAR(A,B). Due to multipath interference of fading
channels, values around 50% for KAR(A,E) and KAR(B,E) are expected. Again,
this means that Eve has no further advantage for reconstructing the key by analyzing
the signals she receives compared to when she merely tries to randomly guess the
bits of the secret key (i.e., having no information at all).
6.3.3.2. Bit Generation Rate
We define the bit generation rate BGR as the number of shared secret bits generated
per time unit. In our setup, BGR can be given by
BGR := KAR ×N ×Q∆T , (6.7)
where KAR is the key generation rate, N the number of iterations according to the
protocol shown in Section (cf. Section 6.3.1), Q the number of quantization bits and
∆T the time needed to perform the protocol.
6.3.3.3. Randomness - the NIST Statistical Test Suite
Calculating a priori the randomness associated to the physical characteristics of an
environment proved to be a very difficult task, if not even impossible. Accordingly,
we consider measuring the randomness a posteriori, i.e., after the key extraction
process. As in other works [PJC+13, YMR+09, MTM+08], we employ the NIST
Statistical Test Suite. This suite was developed by the Random Number Generation
Technical Working Group (RNG-TWG) of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST). According to the documentation, the purpose of this group was
to develop a battery of statistical tests to detect non-randomness in binary sequences
constructed using random number generators and pseudo-random number generators
utilized in cryptographic applications (cf. [BRS+10]). Therefore, these tests intend
to detect any deviations of a binary sequence from randomness. In regular cryp-
tographic applications, this may have origin in a bad random generator design or
some other anomalies. For the sake of self-containedness of this work, we briefly
introduce the notions of Random Number Generators (RNG) and Pseudorandom
Number Generators (PRNGs). The interested reader should refer to [BRS+10].
Random Number Generators (RNGs) These generators extract their randomness
from an entropy source using some processing function (the entropy distillation
process). This function should be implemented in such a way that no long strings
of 0s or 1s appear. A frequent entropy source is the electronic noise originated in an
electronic circuit, the timing of user processes (e.g., movements with the mouse or
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keystroking speed) or even quantum effects in a semiconductor. The output of RNGs
may be used directly in cryptographic operations or may be used as the input of a
Pseudorandom Number Generators (see under). If used directly, one should test the
string for randomness, as some irregular patterns may not necessarily have origin
in some random process, but rather be the superposition of deterministic effects.
Statistical tests help to detect this regularities and test for randomness. Under
some circumstances, usual RNGs have the drawback that the string generation rate
might be too low. This justifies the use of a PRNG.
We should note that the key exchange methods based on the physical properties
of the environment are methods for the physical generation of randomness, where
the entropy source is the unknown physical channel between the parties. However,
since the channel is reciprocal, it allows for common (or shared) randomness. Using
this method, we simultaneously achieve generation and sharing of randomness.
Pseudorandom Number Generators (PRNGs) PRNGs may be more suitable to
produce large quantities of random numbers, However, they need an input value,
called seed. The output of a PRNG is a deterministic function of this value. This
means that a PRNG needs a RNG for the generation of this seed, containing all the
randomness. Generally, the outputs of a PRNG have better statistical properties
than those of the RNGs. Pseudorandom functions also rely on the existence of one-
way functions, since the seed should be kept hidden for an adversary knowing the
output of the generator (see [Gol00] and [KL07] for details). The NIST statistical
tests aim at finding some pattern showing non-randomness.
Implementations of the NIST suite can be found freely available in the Internet.
The NIST itself provides a C-implementation, with an awkward interface and does
not allow to be called from any outside scripts. Since we deal with more than
8000 generated keys, it is not reasonable to proceed manually. For this reason, we
use a Python implementation of these specifications [Ger]. Curiously enough, the
results of the reference implementation are different from those presented in the
documentation. The results of the Python implementation seem to be much more
in agreement (until the fifth decimal number) with those from the documentation.
The output of all these tests is a so-called P-value. This value corresponds to the
probability that a perfect random number generator would have produced a sequence
less random than the sequence that was tested, given the kind of non-randomness
assessed by the test [BRS+10]. A P-value ≥ 0.01 means that the sequence would be
considered to be random with a confidence of 99%, whereas a P-value ≤ 0.01 means
that the conclusion was that the sequence is non-random with a confidence of 99%.
P-value = 1.0 would correspond to perfect randomness, whereas P-value = 0.0 to a
perfect deterministically generated sequence.
This suite defines fifteen possible tests, which check if the input test sequence
fulfill conditions that a random sequence should meet. Next, we introduce these
tests in a nutshell. Details can be found in [BRS+10]. Some of these tests are also
briefly described in [PJC+13].
Used Tests Since other tests require too long strings, not available to us, we only
used six of tests presented in [BRS+10], namely the Cumulative Sums Test (C),
Frequency (monobit) Test (F), Runs Test (R), Discrete Fourier Transform Test (D),
Serial Test (S), and the Approximate Entropy Test (A).
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For the sake of self-containedness of this work, we shortly explain these tests. For
more details, refer to [BRS+10].
Cumulative Sums Test Also known as cumsum test. For each bit, it calculates
the difference of the number of 0s appearing up to a certain point with the number
of 1s. In other words, it calculates the position of a random walk whose variable is
the bits of the sequence: to bit 1, it corresponds to a movement to the right (+1);
to bit 0, a movement to the left (−1). If this value diverges strongly from zero (the
initial position), then we talk of a non-random teststring;
Frequency (monobit) Test This test focuses on counting the number of 0s and 1s
in the test sequence. It checks whether the number of 0s and ones are approximately
the same, as it is expected in a random sequence;
Runs Test This test checks the number of runs of 0s and 1s of several lengths and
compare to the values of a random sequence. It basically tests if the change from 0s
to 1 or vice-versa are too slow or too fast;
Serial Test This test checks if every m-bit pattern has the same probability of
appearing as every other m-bit pattern, which happens in a random sequence;
Approximate Entropy Test This test compares the frequency of overlapping blocks
of two consecutive lengths (lengths m and m + 1) against the expected result for a
random sequence.
Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test Hereby the spikes of a Fourier Trans-
formation are used for testing periodicity. If too many spikes appear, it means there
is a periodic repetition in the teststring;
6.3.4. Results
After collecting the data, we performed a thorough analysis of the results. For
all runs and environments, we generated quantizer profiles for all extractors and
for different values of Q. As an example, the typical output of the quantizer for
the extractor XZ for Q = 3 for an indoor environment is depicted in Figure 6.13.
The reciprocity property is reflected in the fact that both upper plots are similar,
whereas the multipath interference becomes clear when we compare the upper with
the downer plots in each column.
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Figure 6.13.: Typical output of the quantizer for Q = 3. Upper left: signal received
by Alice when Bob sends; Upper right: signal received by Bob when Al-
ice sends; downer left: signal received by Eve when Bob sends; downer
right: signal received by Eve when Alice sends.
In A.1, we show the dependency on Q of KAR and min-entropy (cf.[BK12]) of
the generated keys at Alice and Bob (before the information reconciliation step)
for the extractor XZ, which is the one showing best results (as we describe later in
Section 6.3.5.2). We present the results of the NIST tests for the extracted key. The
results are taken on all five runs, i.e., for a data set containing five elements. For the
sake of simplicity and w.l.o.g., we only present the plots for four indoor positions,
namely Z = a, Z = d, Z = g and Z = k, and for all seven outdoor positions (R,
SU a, SU b, SU c, SU d, U a, U b). Afterwards, we combine the data of all six
configurations (see Table 6.1) results for each position. In Appendix A.2, we plot
the results for the KAR values depending on Q in a box plot. We also put forward
the results of the NIST tests for 5 runs/configuration × 6 configurations/position,
i.e., for a total of 30 data points. We restrict ourselves to show the results for the
positions already mentioned in Appendix A.1. Next, we present the results for the
KAR values depending on Q in a box plot and the number of tests passed for each
test in a bar chart, where C, F, R, D, S and A in each bar stand for Cumsums
test, Frequency (monobit) test, Runs test, Discrete Fourier Transform test and
Approximate entropy test, respectively. As we seek the best extractor for indoor and
for outdoor environments separately, we divide the data in indoor and outdoor data
elements. Since we performed 5 runs per configuration, 6 configuration per position,
11 positions for indoor (Z = a, ..., k) and 7 positions for outdoor experiments (R,
SU a, SU b, SU c, SU d, U a, U b), we have a total of 5× 6× 11 = 330 data points
for indoor and 5× 6× 7 = 210 for outdoor, which we analyze separately.
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6.3.4.1. Extractor Amplitudes (X)
Indoor
Figure 6.14.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure 6.15.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Outdoor
Figure 6.16.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure 6.17.: Result of the NIST tests.
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6.3.4.2. Extractor Zeros (Z)
Indoor
Figure 6.18.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure 6.19.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Outdoor
Figure 6.20.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure 6.21.: Result of the NIST tests.
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6.3.4.3. Extractor Product of Amplitudes and Zeros (XZ)
Indoor
Figure 6.22.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure 6.23.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Outdoor
Figure 6.24.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure 6.25.: Result of the NIST tests.
6.3. Experiment: Key Exchange Evaluation 99
6.3.4.4. Extractor Square of Both ((XZ)2)
Indoor
Figure 6.26.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure 6.27.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Outdoor
Figure 6.28.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure 6.29.: Result of the NIST tests.
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6.3.4.5. Extractor Trimmed Mean (trm)
Indoor
Figure 6.30.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure 6.31.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Outdoor
Figure 6.32.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure 6.33.: Result of the NIST tests.
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6.3.4.6. Extractor Division Amplitudes by Zeros (X/Z)
Indoor
Figure 6.34.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure 6.35.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Outdoor
Figure 6.36.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure 6.37.: Result of the NIST tests.
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6.3.5. Discussion
The conducted experiments for validating our novel key exchange method in real-
world indoor and outdoor scenarios allow us to make interesting empirical observa-
tions and deduce useful relations between the different protocol parameters and its
performance.
Combining this information, we are able to choose the best extractors for indoor
and outdoor environments among the described extractor candidates. We described
a dependency between the evolution of KAR and the number of quantization bits,
Q, as well as between quality of randomness associated with the key bitstring and
Q.
Finally, we estimate the secret key bit generation rate and identify some short-
comings associated with this technique.
6.3.5.1. Dependency of KAR and Randomness on Q
The plots in Section 6.3.4 indicate that the quality of randomness increases with
Q. This is given by the increasing value of the min-entropy (see Appendix A.1)
and by the number of NIST tests passed (see the bar charts for the latter, e.g. in
Section 6.3.5).
KAR vs Q. The key agreement rate decreases with the number of quantization
bits Q. An increase of Q leads to closer quantization levels, which means that the
noise plays an important role in defining the secret key bits. Therefore, since noise is
random and not shared by Alice and Bob, it is responsible for “asymmetries” in the
system, which are reflected in the KAR values. The chances that the same point
in the quantizer profile (see Figure 6.13) of Alice and Bob are in different intervals
increase with Q. Therefore, with only few exceptions, KAR values decrease for
the channel A-B. If interpreted as a measure of the system’s symmetry, the results
confirm our expectations. Likewise, the values of KAR for the E-A and E-B channels,
reflecting the multipath properties of the channel, are around 50%.
Randomness vs Q. On the other hand, the bigger the value of Q, the bigger the
amount of the quantization levels, as M = 2Q. Thus, the intervals corresponding
to a block of Q bits during the quantization process become much thinner, which
implies that the quantization process becomes more sensitive to small variations
of the signal. These small variations have unpredictable causes, such as noise or
other hardware imparities. If the influence of noise is much bigger (equivalently, we
can say that the signal-to-noise ratio, SNR, during the quantization is much lower),
the randomness coming from noise increases. The probability that blocks of Q bits
repeat in consecutive frequencies also diminishes, which explains why the random
tests perform better for higher values of Q. More noise means more randomness.
As a consequence, the number of passed tests increase. In our analysis, a given test
is considered to be passed if and only if the same test is passed for both Alice and
Bob’s secret key bitstrings.
6.3.5.2. Choice of the Extractor
Since KAR decreases with Q and the randomness (higher min-entropy values and
number of NIST tests passed) increases with Q, we have to find a compromise
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between key agreement and key security. We define the optimal value of Q for
a certain extractor as being the maximal value of Q such that the following two
conditions hold:
• on the one hand, KAR(A,B) values are bigger than a certain threshold. We
define this threshold to be 80%. The lower the values of KAR, the more
information is revealed to an eavesdropper about the key during the infor-
mation reconciliation phase [PJC+13]. On the other hand, KAR(E,A) and
KAR(E,B) should be as close as possible to 50%;
• all the NIST tests should pass at least once.
Next, we determine the value of Q that is best suited for a given extractor in a
certain environment, denoted by Q∗. These values can be read found in Figures 6.14
- 6.37 and are given in Table 6.2.
Extractor Indoor Outdoor
X 4 2
Z 3 2
XZ 4 3
(XZ)2 4 3
trm 4 2
X/Z 4 2
Table 6.2.: Values for Q∗ for each extractor depending on the environment.
In general, the extractor XZ shows the best results for both inside and outside
conditions. All results concerning this extractor are shown in detail in the Appen-
dices A.1 and A.2. Stability can be deduced by observing the amount of the outliers
in the box plots, i.e., points outside the main box, and the limited span of the data
points. This extractor has also shown to be the most stable, as we can conclude by
visual inspection of the KAR box plots (see the figures in Section 6.3.4.3).
6.3.5.3. Bit Generation Rate
In our implementation of the key exchange protocol using USRP devices, each
run takes around ∆T ≈ 19 s to be executed. As, in our case, we have N = 44
frequency iterations, for a KAR ≈ 80%, we have, according to Equation (6.7),
BGR = 5.5 bits/s and BGR = 7.4 bits/s for Q = 3 and Q = 4, respectively.
6.3.5.4. Drawbacks
In this section, we describe a few issues arising from the implementation of our
protocol. First, from our experimental results, we acknowledge that no significant
improvements in the bit generation rate is achieved, since its value is similar to
the values obtained in [YMR+09]. However, our setup is implemented in hardware
that is not dedicated to this specific application, and therefore requires intensive
communication between the transceiver devices and the laptop. We believe that each
run would be processed much faster in a dedicated hardware experimental setup.
We claim, however, that our method provides a higher degree of security against
reconstruction and side-channel attacks than previous fading-based key exchange
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techniques. The main reason for this is that we include the hardware asymmetries
during the secret key generation process.
Another drawback of our technique lies in the unavoidable interference with other
WLAN networks. This is however an unavoidable problem for all the wireless sys-
tems operating in the same frequency ranges. We observed a more intensive interfer-
ence especially in a semi-urban environment, due to the several WLAN access points
and packet traffic around the Informatics Department building. As a workaround,
we propose to use other bands of the spectrum, not occupied by other WLAN sig-
nals. We acknowledge that our technique is not jamming-resistant (cf. Section 3.4),
unless frequency hopping techniques [TV05] are employed.
Checking the results for SU c (Single Configuration – Figures A.8.1 and A.8.2)
and SU d (Single Configuration – Figures A.9.1 and A.9.2), one can see that they
still have a big KAR(E,A) value and a min-entropy of zero for low values of Q.
One can also see that the bar charts indicate several failed tests (red color), which
shows low randomness. This clearly means that when there is no line-of-sight, a
large number of long series of 1s or 0s might appear due to the massive obstructing
obstacle, since the direct path component is predominant (as in [MTM+08]).
We have observed that a few runs show a low level of reciprocity for urban en-
vironments, which can be confirmed by the values for KAR(A,B). This is due to
synchronization issues. We realized that the traffic of cars often interrupted the TCP
packet delivery responsible for the synchronization (see Figure 6.5). Therefore, due
to several retries, the synchronization time is much bigger than the coherence time
of the channel. Thus, there is a big time gap between the moments when the channel
is sounded by both parties. Since this environment is very dynamic and, therefore,
the coherence time short, both parties will receive different channel responses.
We also discovered an issue concerning the reference extractor Z. In the box plot
(in Figure 6.3.4.2), we can see that the green boxes and the yellow and red boxes
partially superpose in the KAR-axis. This means that the values of KAR(E,A)
and KAR(E,B) are too large for indoor, which makes it unsuitable for practical
applications. A reason for this might be similar frequency oscillations. This extractor
only serves as a reference, as the influence of fading is not taken into consideration
for the features extraction.
6.3.5.5. Other Observations
The results obtained for the cases of different heights do not show significant differ-
ences, as one can see by comparing the results for Outdoor: Urban a and Outdoor:
Urban b experiments presented in the Appendix. We confirmed that the most impor-
tant factor influencing the reciprocity is the dynamic behavior of the environment.
6.3.5.6. Strategy for a Practical Implementation
First, both parties start, as usually, by sounding the channel and extracting its main
characteristics as explained in Section 5.3.1. Since the environment conditions are
unpredictable at the moment of the protocol execution and given our experimental
results shown before, we suggest to use the extractor XZ and Q = 4 and Q = 3 for
indoor and outdoor, respectively (or simply Q = 3 for both environments (see Ta-
ble 6.2)). Afterwards, each party applies the NIST tests to the originated bitstring
and informs his counterpart of the result (failed, if at least one of the tests failed; or
passed, otherwise). If at least one party has failed, both parties should restart the
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protocol and repeat the sounding channel process expecting that, meanwhile, the
channel has changed sufficiently to contain enough randomness (entropy). If both
parties passed, they proceed to the information reconciliation step (cf. Section 2.3).
Subsequently, if they determine that the condition “KAR > threshold = 80%” is
satisfied, they set their common secret key as the bitstring generated after the recon-
ciliation procedure. If this condition is not satisfied, meaning that Eve received too
much information during the execution of the information reconciliation protocol,
the key exchange protocol should be restarted.
6.4. Conclusion
In this chapter, we experimentally demonstrate the surge of a baseband signal as a
result of differences in the hardware of the sender and emitter. In order to enhance
the total security of fading-based key exchange, we combine these hardware effects
with channel fading effects. We proposed a new fading-&-hardware-based key ex-
change protocol and experimentally validated this novel technique. We conducted a
series of experiments in order to find an optimal way of combining the information
from the environment with hardware-dependent signals. We presented several meth-
ods for performing this combination and we make extensive studies to confirm its
feasibility under real-world conditions. For that purpose, we identify some quality
criteria and check if our method meets them under different constraints.
This chapter confirms that there are several factors that can influence the quality
of the generated key. The type of the surrounding environment and the number
of quantization bits, Q, play an important role. We showed that this parameter
determines the quality of the key and therefore must be chosen carefully: a larger
value of Q makes this technique more sensitive to small variations in the channel
or to hardware noise. The trade-off between a high KAR and randomness must be
taken into account in the choice of Q.
Our experimental results evidence that our new technique seems to be a promis-
ing method for secret key generation, especially when executed in an indoor en-
vironment. Due to the nature of the wireless medium, its performance still needs
improvement when applied in outdoor environments.
We estimate that combining a previously known secret using conventional crypto-
graphic methods with our technique can improve the overall security of the system.
That would be the case, e.g., when the known secret would be used to encode a
different sequence of central frequencies for sounding the channel, using a method
similar to frequency-hopping. Since an adversary would not know the frequency of
the current signal sounding the channel, he would have to sound the channel in a
very wide band of the spectrum, increasing the interferences and the noise associated
with the measurements. Besides, if only equipped with a narrowband receiver, it
could be unfeasible for an attacker to measure the signal received by Alice or Bob,
even if located near their nodes.
7. Conclusion
We conclude our work by listing some open problems and suggesting new topics for
further research. The usage of the physical properties of the wireless channels for
the key agreement problem has become a fast-growing research topic in the wireless
security community. This method provides several advantages over traditional key-
exchange techniques in terms of time and energy consumption. Few implementations
aiming to extract a secret key from shared randomness contained in the wireless
channel have been proposed and thoroughly explored in the literature.
Being dependent on the variable surrounding environment, these methods still
lacked precise security guarantees. Therefore, a security evaluation based on the
complexity of the environment had yet to be done. In Chapter 4, we presented
some shortcomings of the fading-based key exchange protocols and, by doing so,
highlighted the importance of a security evaluation. We modeled a simple channel
and showed how a passive eavesdropper is able to reconstruct the information that
both legitimate parties extract from the environment by using merely the signals
received from both parties. This raises the question whether it is possible to conduct
a formal evaluation of the complexity of this attack depending on the constitution
of the environment.
Furthermore, the study of side-channel attacks is a very lively topic in crypto-
graphic research. Such attacks can partially or totally reveal the secret key by
analyzing uncommon sources of information of any cryptographic system, such as
electric current consumption, time or even the frequencies pattern of the sound waves
emanated by a processor. We introduced a new attack based on the reradiation ef-
fect that every antenna displays and determined the precise conditions and physical
boundaries under which this attack can be mounted. The question of whether there
are other side-channels that can be explored against this protocol is an open topic.
As a countermeasure against these attacks, we introduced in Chapter 5 a new
method for increasing the security of fading-based key exchange techniques by le-
veraging the inherent and single properties of the hardware components, namely
the local oscillators, during the channel sounding process. Specifically, we harvested
another source of randomness by also considering the symmetrical differences in the
oscillation frequencies of the sender’s and receiver’s local oscillators. We combined
this information with the environment entropy in order to enhance the total secu-
rity of the key exchange system. The security of this measure depends not only
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on the environment complexity, but also on the precision of the receiver oscillators.
An attacker would need extreme precise oscillators in order to reconstruct the le-
gitimate signal accurately. In Section 3.5, several hardware imparities have been
described. The usage of some kind of other imparities than frequency oscillations
for the purpose of key exchange is a topic for further research.
We experimentally validated our method under real-world constraints, both in
indoor and outdoor environments. In Chapter 6, we showed that our method seems
to be a promising technique for key extraction. However, we were able to iden-
tify some drawbacks of our method under outdoor conditions. The interferences of
waves coming from other WLAN sources operating in the same frequency bands
and some synchronization issues contribute to the degeneration of the quality of the
results. As future work, we suggest conducting experiments in other spectral bands
in order to check how much the results are improved and if these shortcomings have
been overcome. Indoor results were more satisfactory, though. For our experimental
setup described in Chapter 6, we used similar transceivers. The question of how
our method performs if the parties have different hardware is also a very interest-
ing subject to explore. Specifically, testing the performance of our method when
implemented in dedicated hardware would also be an interesting topic for further
analysis. In particular, it would be interesting to study how much the oscillation
frequencies vary in different hardware, and if we would achieve a better key agree-
ment rate. We identified a drawback concerning the extracted secret bit rate in our
experiments. Still, we achieved values comparable to some of the systems proposed
by other authors. We presented different methods for combining device-generated
randomness with the randomness provided by the multipath channel. The question
of finding better combination strategies remains open.
We point out that one has to integrate a solution for guaranteeing the authenticity
of the parties before the key exchange takes place. This can be based on radiometric
signatures as shown by other authors and described in Section 3.5. Combining such
authentication methods with our key exchange technique would allow a complete
wireless solution for key management.
The possibility of combining lightweight information-theoretical key exchange
methods (like the one we proposed) with traditional methods (like the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange protocol) for achieving a significant security advantage is a challenging
problem still left open for future research.
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A.1. Extractor XZ: Single Configuration
Only the results for Configuration I (5 runs) are shown - see Table 6.1.
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A.1.1: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization
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Figure A.1.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Figure A.2.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Indoor: Position Z = g
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A.3.1: KAR vs Q.
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Figure A.3.: Result of the NIST tests.
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A.4.1: KAR vs Q.
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Figure A.4.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Outdoor: Rural
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A.5.1: KAR vs Q.
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Figure A.5.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Outdoor: Semi Urban a
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Figure A.6.: Result of the NIST tests.
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A.7.1: KAR vs Q.
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Figure A.7.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Outdoor: Semi Urban c
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A.8.1: KAR vs Q.
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Figure A.8.: Result of the NIST tests.
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A.9.1: KAR vs Q.
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Figure A.9.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Figure A.10.: Result of the NIST tests.
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A.11.1: KAR vs Q.
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Figure A.11.: Result of the NIST tests.
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A.2. Extractor XZ: All Configurations
These plots correspond to Configurations I-VI, a total of 30 runs (= 6 configurations
× 5 runs/configuration, see Table 6.1).
Indoor: Position Z = a
Figure A.12.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure A.13.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Indoor: Position Z = d
Figure A.14.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure A.15.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Indoor: Position Z = g
Figure A.16.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
NIST Test Suites/Quantization Bits
q=2 q=3 q=4 q=5 q=6
N
um
be
r o
f T
es
ts
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
C C C C CF F F F FR R R R RD D D D DS S S S SA A A A A
Pass
Fail
Figure A.17.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Indoor: Position Z = k
Figure A.18.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure A.19.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Outdoor: Rural
Figure A.20.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure A.21.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Outdoor: Semi Urban a
Figure A.22.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure A.23.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Outdoor: Semi Urban b
Figure A.24.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure A.25.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Outdoor: Semi Urban c
Figure A.26.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure A.27.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Figure A.28.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure A.29.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Outdoor: Urban a
Figure A.30.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure A.31.: Result of the NIST tests.
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Outdoor: Urban b
Figure A.32.: Key Agreement Rate vs Quantization Bits.
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Figure A.33.: Result of the NIST tests.
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